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Abstract 
Bribery: Greed versus Reciprocity 
by Uri Gneezy, Silvia Saccardo, Roel van Veldhuizen* 
It is estimated that a trillion dollars are annually exchanged in bribes, distorting justice 
and economic efficiency. In a novel experiment, we investigate the drivers of bribery. Two 
participants compete for a prize; a referee picks the winner. Participants can bribe the 
referee. When the referee can keep only the winner’s bribe, bribes distort her judgment. 
When the referee keeps the bribes regardless of the winner, bribes no longer influence her 
judgment. An extra-laboratory experiment in an Indian market confirms these results. 
Hence, our participants are influenced by bribes out of greed, and not because of a desire 
to reciprocate. 
Keywords: Bribery, Reciprocity, Laboratory Experiment, Extra-Laboratory experiment 
JEL classification: D73, C91, K42 
 
                                                 
*  E-mail: ugneezy@ucsd.edu, ssaccard@andrew.cmu.edu, roel.vanveldhuizen@wzb.eu. 
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I. Introduction 
Bribery affects economic activities around the world. Because it is illegal in 
most places, getting good empirical data about these activities is difficult. 
However, the existing data show bribery is likely widespread. The World Bank 
estimates that $1 trillion exchanges hands in bribes annually (Kaufmann, 2005), 
and many companies report having to pay bribes to win business—from 15% to 
20% in industrialized countries, to 40% in China, Russia, and Mexico 
(Transparency International, 2011). In some places, these kinds of activities are a 
major source of income. For example, bribes are estimated to amount to 20% of 
Russia’s GDP in 2005 (INDEM, 2005).  
Importantly, bribes are often given in small scale interactions, and not 
necessarily using money. Examples include paying police person to avoid a ticket 
for minor traffic violations, sending gifts to teachers, offering free tickets or trips 
to physicians, etc. 
But why do bribes “work?” In particular, if one of the sides in a bribery case 
does not fulfill his part, the other side cannot take him to court or use traditional 
enforcement mechanisms. What prevents one, for example, from accepting a 
payment but then not providing the good? If receiving the bribe is credibly 
contingent on the briber’s success (e.g., winning a contest, or in the case of 
repeated interactions), traditional economic models with selfish agents can 
explain behavior. In other one-shot cases in which receiving a bribe is not 
contingent on delivering the desired outcome, traditional economic assumptions 
may not be sufficient. In these cases, social preferences may be able to explain the 
success of bribery. People might be engaged in reciprocal behavior in which one 
side gives a “gift” and the other reciprocates (Akerlof, 1982; Rabin, 1993; Fehr 
and Gächter, 2000).  
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To reduce bribery, it is important to understand what drives it. In the process of 
understanding the motivation for bribery, experiments are an important tool 
because they can help us isolate key aspects of the relevant behavior. Our paper 
distinguishes between the two rival motivations for bribery discussed above: 
reciprocity and greed (i.e., payoff maximization). This distinction is important 
from a public policy perspective. If reciprocity drives bribery, policy interventions 
should focus on reducing social ties and making reciprocity more difficult, for 
example, by decreasing personal contact through anonymity and staff rotation. If 
greed drives behavior and individuals only care about maximizing their profit, 
such policy interventions will not prevent people from engaging in bribery, and 
traditional anti-corruption methods based on auditing and sanctions may be more 
effective (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Olken, 2007).  
Our ability to distinguish between different motives for bribery comes from the 
novel game we study. The game captures an important feature that distinguishes 
bribery from other transactions: a distortionary effect. This kind of distortion is a 
key element in bribery and occurs when a decision maker uses bribes rather than 
other objective criteria such as merit, performance, or quality to determine who 
receives a particular outcome. As a result, public resources may go to the more 
corrupt people, not necessarily the most talented ones (Pareto, 1896; Goldsmith, 
1999; Del Monte & Papagni, 2001). A large empirical literature has shown that 
such outcomes have detrimental effects on efficiency (see, e.g., Mauro, 1995; 
Reinikka and Svennson, 2004; Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna, and Mullainathan, 
2007; Sequeira and Djankov, 2014; or see Olken and Pande, 2012, for a review).  
We are not the first to study bribery using experiments: the existing 
experimental literature examines different elements of bribing behavior, from the 
effect of staff rotation (Abbink, 2004) and asymmetric liability (Abbink, 
Dasgupta, Gangadharan, and Jain, 2014) to culture (Barr and Serra, 2010; 
Cameron, Chaudhuri, Erkal, and Gangadharan, 2009) and the influence of wages 
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(Abbink, 2005; Armantier and Boly, 2013; Van Veldhuizen, 2013). See Abbink 
and Serra (2012) for a comprehensive survey of these experiments. However, in 
this literature, participants are asked to choose between different monetary 
allocations. These decisions may include negative externalities on a third party, 
but they do not include a distortion of facts or judgment. The ability to study the 
effect of distortion of judgment is, as we show, critical to understanding some 
bribery behaviors.
1
  
To capture this key element, we introduce a new bribery game in which two 
participants (“the workers”) compete on a task. A third participant, the referee, 
then chooses the winner, who gets a prize. Importantly, as we explain below, the 
judgment of the quality of the task is subjective. Apart from working on the task, 
the two workers can also choose to send bribes to the referee. We use this basic 
design to test whether workers actually send money in an attempt to influence the 
referee. When workers choose to send money, we investigate whether these bribes 
distort the referee’s judgment. We also vary whether the referee can keep both 
bribes or only the winner’s bribe. This allows us to test whether the distortion is 
driven by reciprocity or greed, because whenever the referee is able to keep both 
bribes regardless of her decision, greed cannot influence her choice and only 
social preferences may drive behavior.  
In addition to the laboratory experiments conducted in the United States (San 
Diego), we also report the results of an extra-laboratory experiment from a market 
in the city of Shillong in India. The data from a market in a country where 
corruption is more spread allow us to investigate whether our results generalize 
beyond the scope of the original laboratory experiments.  
  
                                                          
1 Previous literature has shown that choices and judgment can be distorted by social pressure (Asch, 1954; Bond and 
Smith, 1996), self-serving biases (Babcock et al., 1995; Lord et al., 1979; Kunda, 1990; Haisley and Weber, 2010, see also 
Bazerman et al., 2002), or through a conflict of interest (Cain et al., 2005; Moore and Loewenstein, 2004). 
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II. The Bribery Game and Research Questions  
II.A. The Bribery Game 
Our bribery game involves three players: two workers and a referee. The 
workers compete against each other on a task and the referee is asked to 
determine a winner. The worker who wins gets a prize of p, and the other worker 
receives nothing. Additionally, workers can send a bribe (𝑏𝑖 ∈ [0,
1
2
𝑝]) to the 
referee, with only integer amounts allowed. 
Our main identification relies on two versions of the basic game. In treatment 
KeepWinner, referees keep the bribe of the winning worker; the other worker’s 
bribe is returned. The referee’s monetary payoff maximizing strategy is then to 
choose the worker who submits the higher bribe. Assuming the referee chooses 
this strategy, and given the restriction that bi≤0.5p, the workers’ monetary payoff 
maximizing strategy is to bribe $1 more than the other worker. This strategy 
results in a unique Nash equilibrium in which both workers bribe the maximum 
bi=0.5p. The referee’s equilibrium payoff under these assumptions is ΠR = bi∗, 
where i* is the winner of the round. The monetary payoff of each worker i is 
given by   
  Πi = {
−bi + p     if i wins 
0                if i loses
} 
 
In the second treatment we study (“KeepBoth”), the referee keeps both bribes, 
and the payoff for the referee in each given round is therefore given by ΠR = bi +
bj. The monetary payoff of each worker i is given by 
  Πi = {
−bi + p     if i wins 
−bi             if i loses
} 
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A monetary payoff maximizing referee will then be financially indifferent 
between both workers, irrespective of the bribes. The workers’ payoff-
maximizing strategy depends on their beliefs regarding how the referee will 
reward bribes. In particular, whenever a worker’s belief that referees will select 
the worker with the higher bribe as the winner (pRef) is low enough, the best 
response will be not to bribe. For the parameters used in the experiment, when 
pRef<.6, workers’ optimal strategy is not to bribe. For .6≤pRef<1, a mixed 
equilibrium exists in which workers bribe with some probability. For pRef=1, a 
pure strategy equilibrium exists in which both workers bribe the maximum. For a 
more detailed analysis, see Appendix A8. 
This game allows us to study whether bribes induce referees to distort the true 
ranking between workers, resulting in an allocation of the prize based on bribes 
rather than performance, and to investigate which motives drive distortion. A 
feature of this game is that the referee’s payoff depends only on the bribes and not 
on worker performance. This reflects real-world situations where decision-makers 
receive a fixed wage and do not have a direct individual incentive to maintain 
quality standards. This feature of our design also allows us to cleanly disentangle 
greed, reciprocity, and moral costs of distortion, as discussed below.  
Finally, in order to answer our main research question and isolate the effect of 
distortion, we deliberately did not introduce other elements often associated with 
bribery, such as monitoring, punishment, and third-party externalities. Future 
research could use our bribery game to incorporate these additional features.  
II.B. Research Questions 
The two treatments described above help us in answering an important question 
regarding bribery: Does bribing distorts the referee’s judgment, and if so, how this 
distortion interacts with the treatments. In our game, the referee is asked to choose 
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the winner based on the workers’ performance on the task. Basing the decision 
instead on the size of the bribe leads to a distortion of the true ranking between 
workers. If individuals have some moral costs (e.g., lying costs) associated with 
distorting their judgment, they may choose to reward the better performer, and 
bribery would not influence their behavior.
2
 
Two important forces could explain why bribery affects judgment: reciprocity 
and greed. According to the reciprocity, or gift exchange, hypothesis (e.g., 
Abbink et al., 2002; Malmendier and Schmidt, 2012), if a worker sends money to 
the referee, the referee might want to reciprocate the favor by choosing to reward 
the worker who sent her (more) money. In this case, referees will choose the 
worker who sent the higher bribe, because they want to reciprocate the worker 
who was nicer to them, and not just because that bribe provides them with more 
money.
 
In contrast to the gift-exchange explanation, greed implies that referees 
choose the worker who bribes more only when doing so benefits them financially.  
It is important to note that when we refer to reciprocity and gift exchange in the 
paper, we refer exclusively to the non-strategic one, and not to repeated game 
consideration that include profit maximization motives (i.e., greed).  
Comparing behavior in treatment KeepWinner with behavior in treatment 
KeepBoth allows us to test whether moral costs, gift exchange, or greed drive 
behavior. In treatment KeepWinner, a selfish payoff-maximizing referee would 
base her decision solely on the size of the bribes. Similarly, a referee who cares 
only about reciprocity will also choose the worker who sent the higher bribe. In 
treatment KeepBoth, the referee’s choice of a winner does not affect her payment. 
Hence, a selfish payoff-maximizing referee will be indifferent between workers. 
                                                          
2
 See for example Gneezy, (2005), Dreber and Johannesson (2008), Sutter (2009); see also Cappelen, Sørensen, and 
Tungodden (2013), Erat (2013), and Lightle (2013) for investigations of the factors that affect moral costs in deception 
behavior, and Belot and Schröder (2013), who examine the relationship between payment schemes and lying and theft in a 
principal agent setting.  
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A reciprocal referee will still reward the higher bribe even when doing so does not 
affect her payoff.  
If reciprocity drives the distortion of judgment, the distortionary effects of 
bribery will be similar in both treatments. If greed drives behavior, referees will 
distort their judgment in treatment KeepWinner, but in general not in treatment 
KeepBoth.  
If referees also have moral costs, and—all else equal—prefer an allocation that 
does not require them to distort their judgment, these moral costs may outweigh 
greed and/or reciprocity concerns, preventing distortion of judgment in both 
treatments. However, if the power of greed or reciprocity in our experiment is 
large enough to outweigh moral costs, we expect to see some distortion. By 
comparing the two treatments, assuming moral costs do not change, we can rank 
the importance of greed and reciprocity.  
A feature of our design is that although treatment is randomized and workers 
are randomly paired within sessions, bribes are not determined at random. To 
analyze referees’ behavior and make treatment comparisons, referees in the two 
treatments must face similar combinations of bribes. That is, the distribution of 
the difference between the bribes the referees receive must be similar across both 
treatments. We will explore whether this is the case in the results section, where 
we also discuss how other possible differences in bribing behavior across the two 
treatments may affect referees’ decisions. 
 
II.C. Additional Treatments 
Other than the two main versions of the basic game, we ran five additional 
treatments to provide additional support for our findings and rule out alternative 
explanations.  
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Rejecting Bribes.—First, we take into account that, in many cases, the person 
being bribed (the referee in our game) may choose to reject the bribe. We 
consider the effect of such an option in treatments KeepWinnerReject and 
KeepBothReject. These treatments are identical to treatment KeepWinner and 
treatment KeepBoth, respectively, except that referees also have the option to 
reject both bribes. Honest behavior may imply choosing a worker but rejecting his 
bribe. Adding the ability to reject even the winning bribe allows us to investigate 
how this option affects behavior. Note that equilibrium predictions are unaffected, 
since no payoff-maximizing referee will ever reject a bribe.  
 
Inequity Aversion.—The third additional treatment involves a higher wage for 
the referee (treatment HighWage). This treatment is similar to treatment 
KeepWinnerReject, except that referees receive a higher show-up fee ($20 instead 
of $5). Changing the referee’s wage does not affect equilibrium predictions. This 
treatment allows us to test whether some sort of inequality preferences (see, e.g., 
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) can explain our results. In 
treatment KeepWinner (and in all other treatments), the referee starts with less 
money than the workers ($5 vs. $10). Therefore, accepting the higher bribe will 
decrease inequity by making the referee’s income more similar to both the 
winner’s income and the loser’s income. By contrast, in treatment HighWage, the 
referee starts with more money than the workers ($20 vs. $10). Therefore, 
accepting the higher bribe will now increase inequity. Thus, inequity aversion 
would predict referees would be less likely to let the higher bribe win in treatment 
HighWage than in treatment KeepWinner. In this treatment, we also included the 
possibility of rejecting bribes in order to give referees the possibility of decreasing 
inequity by choosing a winner without keeping either of the two bribes.   
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The Importance of Moral Costs of Distortion.—In two additional treatments, 
we investigate the importance of moral costs that may arise when referees need to 
distort their judgment to award the prize to the worker who send the higher bribe. 
The fourth additional treatment, Treatment NoTask, is identical to treatment 
KeepBoth, except that workers no longer compete on a task. In this case, choosing 
the higher bribe does not require the referee to distort judgment, as there is no 
better performer. Hence, choosing the higher bribe in this context does not 
generate a moral cost. By comparing this treatment to treatment KeepBoth, we 
can therefore test whether moral costs of distortion are important, and whether in 
the absence of such distortion, gift exchange can account for the results. This 
treatment is more closely related to the existing bribery games in the literature. As 
discussed above, these studies do not capture the distortionary effect of bribes that 
our design introduces. 
The fifth additional treatment involves a variation of treatment KeepWinner in 
which workers compete on a different task (treatment Objective). As we discuss 
in detail below, the main treatments of this paper use a subjective task. In 
treatment Objective, we replace this task with a more objective one. When 
evaluating a subjective task, distorting judgment could be easier because referees 
may convince themselves that the worker with the higher bribe is also the better 
performer. If the task is more objective, convincing oneself that the worker with 
the higher bribe is the better performer could be more difficult, and as a result the 
moral costs associated with distortion of judgment may be higher. Thus, similar to 
treatment NoTask, treatment Objective tests the importance of moral costs, but it 
does so by increasing rather than decreasing them. Removing or changing the 
nature of the task does not affect equilibrium predictions. 
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III. Experimental design 
III.A. Task 
In all treatments except NoTask and Objective, we chose a task that involves 
creativity and for which the evaluation is not fully objective but depends partly on 
the referee’s subjective taste. In particular, we asked workers to write a joke either 
about economists (round 1) or psychologists (round 2). All instructions can be 
found in Appendix B. 
We chose to use a subjective task because in many real-life situations in which 
bribery is relevant, decision makers cannot exclusively rely on objective criteria 
when deciding how to allocate resources. Procurement auctions are an example of 
these situations, because the decision to award a procurement contract to a certain 
supplier is based on both objective parameters (e.g., price, completion time), 
which can easily be observed, and partially subjective ones (e.g., esthetics), which 
are left to the auctioneer’s discretion (Burguet and Che, 2004). 
The task of judging jokes incorporates both the subjective and the objective 
component. In terms of the subjective component, humor is at least partially a 
matter of taste, so that for relatively similar jokes, different referees may have 
different opinions about which joke is the better one. However, when jokes differ 
enough in quality, one of them can also be objectively regarded as the better joke. 
We will see below that referees were capable of selecting the (objectively) better 
joke in such cases. For an overview of some of the jokes written by participants, 
see Appendix C.  
By contrast, in treatment Objective, workers were asked to work on a variation 
of the Stroop Task (Stroop, 1935). Each participant was shown a sequence of 
color words (e.g., blue, red, yellow) one after the other and was asked to identify 
the ink color of each word. We chose to use a congruent version of the task, 
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meaning the color word and its ink color were compatible (e.g., blue was always 
written in blue letters). Participants were informed that their final score was equal 
to the number of words successfully identified, and were asked to complete as 
many words as possible. 
Upon completion of the task, their final score was graphically represented on a 
score sheet in which every successfully identified word was represented by a dot 
(see Appendix B4 for the instructions and a sample score sheet). This procedure 
meant referees could count the dots to objectively determine which worker 
performed better, but had some moral wiggle room in that they needed to expend 
some effort to objectively evaluate workers’ performance. We introduced the 
score sheet both to add some moral wiggle room and to give referees a non-trivial 
task to perform. 
III.B. Procedure 
We conducted the experiment in the laboratory of the Rady School of 
Management at the University of California San Diego with a total of 333 
participants. Participants were recruited using standard recruitment procedures at 
the laboratory via an online experimental registration system. All UCSD students 
are able to register for this system to participate in laboratory experiments.  
For each session, we invited 10 participants to the laboratory. Every participant 
from the subject pool was notified about the sessions and was eligible to 
participate. Each session consisted of exactly six participants, and therefore any 
time more than six people showed up, we randomly selected six and dismissed the 
extra participants after paying them a $5 show-up fee.  
Each session lasted approximately 50 minutes. Upon being selected to 
participate, participants were randomly assigned to a computer station and were 
asked to follow the instructions on the screen. Participants were anonymously 
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matched in groups of three, and each of them was either assigned to the role of 
workers (called participant A and B in the experiment) or the referee. We then 
moved the referees to separate rooms (one room for each referee), where they 
received the remainder of their instructions. Workers continued reading their 
instructions in the main lab. Neither workers nor referees knew which of the other 
participants were matched with them. 
We then informed participants (except those in the NoTask treatment) about the 
task and the referee’s role in determining the winner. In treatment NoTask, we 
informed participants about the referee’s role in determining the winner but did 
not ask them to complete any task. In all cases, neither the workers nor the 
referees were yet informed about the workers’ opportunity to send money to the 
referee. 
 On their desks, workers had an envelope with their $10 show-up fee, in $1 
bills. Each referee had an envelope with a $5 show-up fee in all treatments except 
treatment HighWage, in which the referee received an envelope with a $20 show-
up fee. The information about the other participants’ initial show-up fees was 
made common knowledge.  
After all workers had read their instructions and completed some attention 
questions, they learned the topic of the jokes for the first round (“economists”) 
and had 10 minutes to type a joke (in the NoTask treatment, workers were told to 
wait 10 minutes; in the Objective treatment they had 5 minutes to work on the 
Stroop task). The experimenters then printed and returned each joke (or score 
sheet in the Objective treatment) to the workers. Workers received only their own 
joke or score sheet, and were not informed about the jokes or scores of the other 
workers in the experiment. While the experimenters were printing the jokes, we 
asked workers to state their expected likelihood of having a better joke than their 
opponent (“What do you believe is the probability that you will have a better joke 
than your opponent?”).   
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The workers then received a second set of instructions on the screen, which 
notified them of the opportunity to send money to the referee. In particular, 
workers were asked to put the printed copy of their joke (or score sheet in 
treatment Objective) in a large envelope labeled with their participation ID, and 
were given the opportunity to add up to $5 of their show-up fee to the envelope. 
Meanwhile, the referees also received a second set of instructions telling them 
about the possibility of workers sending them money. 
After all workers had prepared their envelopes, an experimenter collected them, 
privately recorded the monetary content of each, and then gave the envelopes to 
the referees. Upon receiving the envelopes, each referee had five minutes to rate 
the quality of the workers’ jokes on a scale of 0 to 10 (except in treatment NoTask 
and treatment Objective), and to place a winner card and a loser card in the 
winner and loser’s envelope, respectively. After five minutes, the workers 
returned the envelopes to the experimenter, who then recorded the referees’ 
decisions.  
In treatments KeepWinner and Objective, the referee could keep only the 
winner’s monetary transfer and had to return the loser’s money by putting it back 
in the envelope. In treatments KeepWinnerReject and HighWage, the referee had 
to return any money received by the loser, but was asked to decide whether to 
keep the winner’s money or return both bribes. In treatments KeepBoth and 
NoTask, the referee kept all the money sent by both workers, whereas in 
treatment KeepBothReject, the referee also had the option to return both the 
winner and the loser’s money. Table 1 summarizes the experimental treatments. 
Note that we have 60 participants (20 groups) in the two main treatments, 
KeepWinner and KeepBoth, and in treatment HighWage. For treatment Objective, 
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we have 63 participants (21 groups).
3
 For the four remaining treatments, we have 
30 participants (10 groups) in each treatment. 
 
 
 TABLE 1—THE EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENTS 
 Which bribe does the 
referee keep? 
Task Participants Ref. show-up fee 
     
KeepWinner Only winner’s  Jokes 60 $5 
     
KeepBoth Both Jokes 60 $5 
     
KeepWinnerReject Chooses whether to Jokes 30 $5 
 keep winner’s    
KeepBothReject Chooses whether to Jokes 30 $5 
 keep both     
HighWage Chooses whether to Jokes 60 $20 
 keep winner’s     
NoTask Both No 30 $5 
     
Objective Only winner’s  Objective 63 $5 
     
     
 
The experiment consisted of two rounds with the same matching of participants. 
To prevent referees from reciprocating the largest bribe in round 1 for strategic 
reasons, no feedback was provided between rounds. Workers started the second 
round while the referees were still evaluating their first round. The procedure for 
round 2 was identical to that of round 1, apart from the topic of the joke.  
After the second round, both workers and referees were asked to complete a 
survey of basic demographic information. The referees were then paid and left the 
experiment, and workers received back the envelopes for rounds 1 and 2. Each 
envelope contained either a winner or a loser card indicating the referees’ 
decision. For treatments KeepWinner, KeepWinnerReject, HighWage, and 
Objective, the envelope with the loser card also contained any money sent to the 
referee by the worker who lost. For treatments KeepWinnerReject, 
                                                          
3
 In treatment Objective, we had to discard one group because the referee did not follow the instructions and rejected 
both bribes even though he was instructed not to do so. Therefore, we ran one additional session in order to have at least 20 
groups.  
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KeepBothReject, and HighWage, both envelopes could also contain money 
returned by the referee if the referee decided to reject both bribes. Workers were 
then paid $10 for each winner card they had and left the experiment.  
III.C. Joke quality 
After the experiment was completed, we organized additional sessions in which 
participants from the same subject pool, who had not previously participated in 
the experiment, evaluated the quality of several pairs of jokes. The jokes were 
evaluated by a total of 752 raters who, for each pair of jokes, had to evaluate the 
quality of each joke (on a scale from 0 to 10) and had to determine which joke 
was funnier. Raters were shown the same pairs of jokes the referees evaluated 
during the experiment, without being informed about the bribes sent by the 
workers. This procedure provides us with a more objective measure of joke 
quality, which is not biased by the presence of bribery. Each independent rater 
evaluated up to six pairs of jokes, chosen at random by an electronic randomizer 
among all the possible pairs of jokes. Each pair of jokes was evaluated by an 
average of 22 independent raters. The full instructions are in Appendix B3. 
IV. Results 
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics on our sample. As the table shows, 
the treatments are balanced with respect to demographics. Joke quality and 
confidence levels are also not statistically different between treatments and rounds 
(Bonferroni or Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple hypothesis testing).  
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TABLE 2—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
         
 Overall Keep 
Winner 
Keep 
Both 
KW 
Reject 
KB 
Rejec
t 
High 
Wage 
No 
Task 
Objective 
         
Joke Quality  3.62 3.57 3.50 3.47 3.81 3.78   
(Round 1) (1.18) (1.10) (1.17) (1.28) (1.43) (1.11)   
Joke Quality 3.54 3.73 3.27 3.39 3.89 3.51   
(Round 2) (1.27) (1.32) (1.43) (1.45) (1.12) (.98)   
Objective Score 176       176 
(Round 1) (15)       (15) 
Objective Score 179       179 
(Round 2) (17)       (17) 
Worker Confidence .51 .48 .53 .49 .55 .41  .62 
(Round 1) (.25) (.28) (.27) (.26) (.24) (.24)  (.19) 
Worker Confidence .49 .44 .56 .41 .53 .39  .59 
(Round 2) (.25) (.28) (.26) (.30) (.28) (.15)  (.22) 
Psychology .14 .13 .12 .13 .03 .18 .17 .14 
 (.34) (.33) (.32) (.35) (.18) (.39) (.38) (.35) 
Economics .24 .20 .18 .23 .43 .25 .37 .16 
 (.43) (.40) (.39) (.43) (.50) (.44) (.49) (.37) 
Other Social Science  .08 .07 .07 .03 .07 .08 .10 .10 
 (.26) (.25) (.25) (.18) (.26) (.28) (.31) (.29) 
Biology/Chemistry  .26 .35 .25 .43 .23 .15 .23 .25 
 (.44) (.48) (.44) (.50) (.43) (.36) (.43) (.44) 
Engineering/Science  .20 .20 .22 .17 .17 .22 .07 .24 
 (.40) (.40) (.42) (.38) (.38) (.42) (.25) (.43) 
Humanities Major .09 .05 .15 .00 .07 .10 .07 .11 
 (.28) (.22) (.36) (.00) (.25) (.30) (.25) (.32) 
Undeclared Major .01 .00 .02 .00 .00 .02 .00 .00 
 (.08) (.00) (.13) (.00) (.00) (.13) (.00 (.00) 
Asian Ethnicity .72 .63 .82 .83 .70 .72 .60 .71 
 (.45) (.49) (.39) (.38) (.47) (.45) (.50) (.46) 
Female .56 .55 .60 .50 .47 .57 .57 .57 
 (.50) (.50) (.49) (.51) (.51) (.50) (.50) (.50) 
Nonnative speaker .16 .15 .18 .13 .23 .15 .20 .13 
 (.37) (.36) (.39) (.34) (.43) (.36) (.40) (.33) 
Age 20.7 21.1 20.5 20.6 20.3 20.6 21.0 20.7 
 (1.92) (2.62) (1.46) (1.65) (2.15) (1.81) (1.30) (1.89) 
         
Observations 333 60 60 30 30 60 30 63 
         
         
Notes: Descriptive statistics. Joke quality is the average rating of the joke by the independent raters. Objective performance 
is the score on the objective task for treatment Objective. Confidence is the worker’s confidence in having a better joke or 
performance than the other worker. The remaining variables are dummies for the respective majors, Asian participants, 
females, and nonnative speakers, and a continuous variable for age, respectively. Among the nonnative speakers, 12% are 
Chinese native speakers, 2% are Spanish native speakers, and the remainder report different languages. 
 
In the remainder of this section, we will use both parametric and non-
parametric tests to test for differences between treatments. Whenever we analyze 
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worker behavior, we use one worker as one independent observation; whenever 
we analyze referee behavior, we use one referee as one independent observation. 
For non-parametric tests involving data from both rounds, we therefore take the 
average over both rounds as the unit of observation. We first analyze worker and 
referee behavior in the two main treatments, KeepWinner and KeepBoth. We then 
discuss the additional treatments to investigate the robustness of our results and 
address potential alternative explanations. 
 
IV.A. Worker Behavior 
The main goal of the paper is to investigate whether and why bribes distort 
choices. To do so, we first need to verify that workers were willing to bribe, and 
that there was sufficient variation in bribe sizes. Figure 1 shows the distribution of 
bribes in the KeepWinner treatment for both rounds. The first thing to note is that 
many workers bribed and there was considerable variation in bribe amounts: 41% 
of bribes were at the maximum $5 and a further 33% of bribes were positive. In 
26% of the cases, workers elected not to send a bribe. Overall, the average bribe 
was $2.80. 
As Figure 1 also shows, the workers in treatment KeepBoth bribed less than the 
workers in treatment KeepWinner. Overall the average bribe in this treatment was 
$0.90 and no bribe was sent in 66% of cases. The difference in the distribution of 
bribes between the KeepWinner and the KeepBoth treatments is significant 
(p<.001, Mann-Whitney). In Appendix A1, we further examine whether worker-
level characteristics are predictive of bribe size. Over all treatments, we find that 
non-native speakers, older participants, and men send higher bribes, whereas 
social science majors (not including economists) send smaller bribes. Importantly, 
we also show that bribe size is not correlated with joke quality (p=.76). 
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Table 3 reports the distribution of bribes per treatment and the average bribes 
per round for all treatments. On average, in the KeepWinner treatment, bribes did 
not change between rounds: the average bribe was $2.83 in the first round and 
$2.78 in the second round (the difference is not statistically significant). In 
treatment KeepBoth, the average bribe was $1.13 in round one and $0.68 in round 
two and this difference is marginally significant (p=.056, Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test).
4
 Additionally, workers who bribed more in round 1 were also likely to bribe 
more in round 2 (r=.52, p=.005 in KeepWinner; r=.60, p<.001 in KeepBoth).  
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. CDF OF BRIBES FOR KEEPWINNER AND KEEPBOTH. 
Note: Empirical cumulative distribution function of all bribes sent in treatments KeepWinner and KeepBoth. 
 
This analysis shows that there is a treatment difference in worker behavior in 
terms of bribes. However, in terms of referee behavior, we are interested in 
                                                          
4 However, this effect is only driven by a few observations. 30 of the 40 workers bribed exactly the same in the second 
round, two people bribed more, and the remaining eight people bribed less.  
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analyzing cases where referees receive two bribes of a different size. Specifically, 
we will analyze whether referees select the better joke or higher bribe as the 
winner, and whether the likelihood of doing so depends on the absolute difference 
between the two bribes (or difference in quality of the two jokes).  
It is therefore important to investigate whether the difference in bribes is similar 
across treatments. The results are presented in the lower panel of Table 3. We 
focus on cases where referees received two different bribes, as these are the only 
cases where the size of the bribe could affect which worker they selected as the 
winner. We find that for these cases the average difference in bribes is similar in 
treatment KeepWinner ($3.03) and treatment KeepBoth ($2.64 p=.482, Mann-
Whitney). Similarly, we find no difference in the distribution of the difference 
between the workers’ bribes (p=1, Kolmogorov-Smirnov). Hence, despite bribes 
being larger in treatment KeepWinner overall, referees who received bribes of 
different size still faced similar financial tradeoffs in both treatments. 
However, referees in treatment KeepBoth were also more likely to receive two 
identical bribes, less likely to face two positive bribes, and less likely to receive 
two large bribes. We control for the first aspect in our regression analysis by 
examining the cases in which bribes differ separately from the cases where bribes 
are identical. We discuss the latter two differences in Appendix A2 and show that 
neither of them affects our main results. In particular, the results suggest referees 
behaved similarly irrespective of the absolute size or of whether they received one 
or two positive bribes.  
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TABLE 3—BRIBES ACROSS TREATMENTS 
 
Overall 
Keep 
Winner 
Keep 
Both 
KW 
Reject 
KB 
Reject 
High 
Wage 
No Task Objective 
 Bribe Frequencies (Both Rounds) 
Bribe=0 41% 26% 66% 13% 58% 53% 25% 36% 
Bribe=1 7% 4% 10% 3% 18% 5% 5% 6% 
Bribe=2 12% 18% 9% 18% 10% 9% 15% 12% 
Bribe=3 8% 10% 6% 13% 5% 4% 18% 10% 
Bribe=4 2% 1% 0 3% 3% 1% 15% 1% 
Bribe=5 28% 41% 9% 53% 8% 29% 23% 36% 
 Bribe Size (Mean) 
Round 1 2.21 2.83 1.13 3.35 1.25 2.08 2.95 2.36 
 (2.12) (2.07) (1.76) (1.92) (1.65) (2.34) (1.79) (2.15) 
Round 2 1.97 2.78 .68 3.60 .75 1.58 2.25 2.48 
 (2.10) (2.13) (1.31) (1.79) (1.41) (2.07) (1.97) (2.22) 
         
Both Rounds 2.10 2.80 .90 3.48 1.00 1.83 2.60 2.42 
 (2.11) (2.09) (1.56) (1.84) 
 
(1.45) (2.20) (1.89) (2.17) 
 Average Difference in Bribes (excluding equal bribes) 
 
Round 1 3.14 3.07 2.92 2.14 2.83 4.21 2.63 3.40 
 (1.47) (1.59) (1.56 (.69) (1.72) (1.31) (1.30) (1.24) 
         
Round 2 2.90 3.00 2.30 3.00 2.60 3.42 3.00 3.29 
 (1.51) (1.36) (1.64) (1.07) (1.82) (1.73) (1.41) (1.54) 
         
Both Rounds 3.03 3.03 2.64 2.60 2.73 3.85 2.82 3.34 
 (1.49) (1.45) (1.59) (.99) (1.68) (1.54) (1.33) (1.37) 
         
N: per round 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ob 
222 40 40 20 
04 
 
20 40 20 42 
N: both rounds 444 80 80 40 40 80 40 84 
 
 
        
Notes: The table gives the relative frequency of bribes of different sizes in the upper panel. The middle panel displays 
average bribe size (over all workers) separately as well as jointly for each treatment and round. The lower panel displays 
the average difference in bribes (over all workers) separately as well as jointly for each treatment and round. Average 
bribes are computed using all bribes, including zeros. Average differences in bribes are computed by subtracting the 
highest bribe from the lowest bribe in a given pair of bribes and are based only on observations in which the two bribes 
were not identical. The numbers in brackets are standard deviations. 
 
Joke Quality.—In order to investigate referee behavior and make treatment 
comparisons, it is also important that the quality of the jokes is similar across 
treatments. To investigate whether this was the case, we use the evaluation 
provided by the independent raters as an unbiased measure of joke quality.  
For our analysis, we are interested in investigating whether the referee selects 
the better joke as the winner. For this purpose, we will focus on two measures of 
quality: the difference in average rating between the two jokes in a pair and the 
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fraction of raters that, for a given pair, chose the same joke as the better one (i.e., 
the degree of agreement across raters). The two measures are highly correlated 
(r=.92, p<.001 for all joke treatments combined). Both measures are similarly 
distributed in the two main treatments (p=.436 and p=.560 for KeepWinner and 
KeepBoth respectively, Kolmogorov-Smirnov). As with bribes, in our analysis, 
we will look at quality differences between the jokes written by the two workers 
in a given pair. The distribution of differences in quality also does not differ 
between KeepWinner and KeepBoth (p=.739, Kolmogorov-Smirnov).  
In Appendix A1, we examine predictors of quality and find that non-native 
speakers, more confident participants and younger participants wrote better jokes. 
Importantly, we find no evidence that bribes are predicted by joke quality (or the 
performance on the objective task), suggesting that overall the quality of workers’ 
performance did not affect their bribing behavior. 
 
IV.B. Does Bribery Distort the Referee’s Judgment? 
In this section, we examine whether and why bribery distorts referees’ 
judgment, using both non-parametric tests and regressions. For the non-
parametric tests, we investigate whether the worker with the higher bribe in the 
pair won the prize. We also investigate whether the worker with the better joke in 
the pair won the prize.  
However, because joke quality is subjective, it is not enough for one joke to 
have a slightly higher quality on either of the two quality measures. Instead, we 
need to know whether one joke is significantly better than the other. For this 
purpose, we consider all joke pairs for which at least 65.1% of the independent 
raters agreed on the winner. With this threshold, the fraction of independent raters 
who selected a given joke over the other is significantly different from chance 
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(i.e., 50%) at the 10% level (z=1.28, p=.1, test of proportions for our minimum of 
18 independent raters). By this threshold, 63% of joke pairs have a significantly 
better joke. 
 In the remaining pairs, the quality of the two jokes was too similar to be 
statistically distinguishable. In such cases, picking one joke over the other did not 
constitute a big distortion. Whenever we refer to better-quality jokes in 
subsequent non-parametric tests, we will only use jokes that are sufficiently 
different by this criterion. Note, however, that in our regression analysis we will 
use all the observations, including cases where bribes and/or quality were similar. 
Appendix A3 presents more details on this threshold and also shows that for a 
threshold of 69.4%, which corresponds to jokes being significantly different at the 
5% level, the results are similar. 
For the Objective treatment, we use participants’ actual scores as the 
performance measure. Similar to the other treatments, we omit the 37% least 
distinguishable performance pairs whenever we refer to better-quality performers. 
In practice, this approach means we only look at pairs in which the difference in 
performance was at least 11 words.   
 
The KeepWinner Treatment.—Did bribing result in a distortion of the referees’ 
judgment? In 86% of the cases, referees in the KeepWinner treatment chose the 
worker who offered the higher bribe as the winner. This number is significantly 
larger than chance (p=.001, Wilcoxon). By contrast, as Figure 2 shows, the better 
joke (as judged by the independent raters) won only 57% of the time, which is not 
significantly different from chance (p=.564, Wilcoxon). Thus, these results 
suggest that bribery distorted referees’ judgment, because they chose the worker 
who paid them more, not the one who wrote the funnier joke.  
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FIGURE 2. WIN CHANCE WHEN HAVING THE HIGHER BRIBE OR BETTER RATING FOR KEEPWINNER AND KEEPBOTH 
Notes: The p-values are calculated using a Wilcoxon signed rank test that tests if the fraction is significantly larger than 
.5. Workers are classified as having a higher quality when at least 65.1% of independent raters agree their joke is better. 
We further investigate the effect of bribes and quality using OLS. In the 
regression, we examine how differences in joke quality (as determined by the 
independent raters) and bribes between the two workers affect the referee’s 
decision. For a given worker, the regression tells us how an increase in her bribe 
or joke quality relative to the other worker affects her probability of winning. The 
more referees care about quality as opposed to bribes, the more beneficial having 
a better joke should be.  
On a more methodological level, because our independent variables are 
differences between the two workers within a given pair, the observations for the 
two workers are always the exact inverse of each other. Hence, for the regression, 
we randomly select one worker per round. We use the same random sample 
throughout the analysis. In Appendix A6, we show that the reported results do not 
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depend on the particular random combination of workers selected for the 
regression. Randomly selecting a worker also implies that selected workers on 
average win approximately 50% of the time; as a result, we do not report the 
constant in the regression table. 
Further, to facilitate comparisons between quality and bribe coefficients, we 
standardize all independent variables, such that the coefficients represent the 
effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in the independent variable. For 
quality, we estimate separate coefficients for cases in which the two bribes are 
identical and cases in which they differ. The latter coefficient is of particular 
interest because it allows us to examine the effect of quality when referees could 
also be influenced by bribes. The former coefficient instead allows us to see 
whether quality affect the likelihood that a given worker wins the prize when 
referees have no incentive to distort their judgment.  
Finally, we compute the p-values reported in the regression tables using a wild 
bootstrap procedure
 
. Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) show that for a small 
number of clusters and/or small cluster sizes, this approach leads to more accurate 
(and more conservative) p-values than alternative techniques. In Appendix A5, we 
also redo all regressions of Table 4, using several alternative techniques, 
including clustered standard errors and non-parametric bootstraps, with very 
similar results.  
Column (1) of Table 4 presents the results. The coefficient for bribes is large, 
positive, and statistically significant. Indeed, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
a given worker’s bribe (relative to the bribe of the other worker) increases her 
likelihood of winning the prize by 31 percentage points. By contrast, the 
coefficient for quality when bribes differ is small and not statistically significant. 
Thus, the regression results confirm that bribes, not quality, influenced referees in 
treatment KeepWinner. 
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The regression results also show that when bribes are identical and can 
therefore not distort behavior, an increase in the quality of a given worker’s joke 
(relative to the other worker) does significantly increase her likelihood of 
winning. This finding shows that despite the subjective nature of the task, referees 
were indeed capable of identifying the higher-quality joke in the absence of 
distortionary incentives.  
 
TABLE 4—OLS REGRESSIONS FOR REFEREES IN KEEPWINNER AND KEEPBOTH 
Dependent Variable: Winner (1=Yes) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Bribe Difference .308*** .086 .274*** 
 (.000) (.140) (.000) 
Quality Difference  (bribes differ) .014 .262** .015 
 (.762) (.010) (.762) 
Quality Difference  (bribes identical) .336** .275** .255** 
 (.020) (.022) (.020) 
DKeepBoth   .008 
   (.980) 
Bribe Difference X DKeepBoth   -.173** 
   (.032) 
Quality Difference X DKeepBoth   .222** 
(bribes differ)   (.014) 
Quality Difference X DKeepBoth   .150 
(bribes identical)   (.156) 
    
Treatment KeepWinner KeepBoth KeepWinner 
   KeepBoth 
Selected Workers Random Random Random 
    
Observations 40 40 80 
    
Clusters 20 20 40 
    
Notes: OLS estimates (p-values). The dependent variable is a dummy that specifies whether the selected worker was 
selected as the winner. Quality Difference is the difference between the quality of the joke (i.e., the average rating by the 
independent raters) of the selected worker and the quality of the joke of the other worker in the pair. Bribe Difference is 
the difference between the bribe sent by the selected worker and the bribe sent by the other worker in the pair. DKeepBoth 
is a dummy that is equal to one for treatment KeepBoth, and zero otherwise. For column (3), the bribe variable and both 
quality variables are standardized using the respective variable’s combined standard deviation over all included 
treatments. P-values are calculated using wild bootstraps. For each regression, we randomly select one worker per 
referee in each round. *** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
 
Finally, the results are similar if we perform this regression separately for each 
round; see Appendix A7. In Appendix A4, we additionally estimate similar 
regressions that incorporate only those pairs of workers who had different bribes 
27 
 
or wrote sufficiently different jokes. Further, we present the results of alternative 
specifications that include separate coefficients for bribes depending on whether 
joke quality was similar or significantly different. The results of the additional 
analyses are in line with the results reported in Table 4. 
 
The KeepBoth Treatment.—Figure 2 and column (2) of Table 4 give an overview 
of the referees’ behavior in the KeepBoth treatment. In 64% of the cases, referees 
chose the worker who offered the higher bribe as a winner. This number is not 
significantly larger than chance (p=.103, Wilcoxon). By contrast, the better joke, 
as judged by our independent raters, won 90% of the time. This proportion is 
significantly larger than chance (p<.001, Wilcoxon). In other words, when the 
referees’ payoff did not depend on the choice of winner, bribery did not distort 
judgment, and referees chose the worker who wrote the funnier joke.  
The regression results are similar. Column (2) of Table 4 shows that an 
increase in the quality of a given worker’s joke (relative to the other worker’s 
joke) significantly increased her likelihood of winning, whereas a relative 
increase in the worker’s bribe did not pay off. In addition, the effect of joke 
quality on the likelihood of winning was similar both when bribes were identical 
and when bribes differed. This finding confirms that referees chose the worker 
who wrote the funnier joke in this treatment.  
 
Greed versus Reciprocity.—Figure 2 shows that having a higher bribe was more 
effective in the KeepWinner treatment (86% vs. 64%, p=.048; Mann-Whitney), 
whereas having a better joke was more effective in the KeepBoth treatment (90% 
vs. 57%, p=.004; Mann-Whitney). The latter effect is driven exclusively by cases 
for which bribes were different. When bribes were equal, referees in both 
treatments (80% for KeepWinner, 78% for KeepBoth) picked the better joke 
(p=.871; Mann-Whitney). When bribes were unequal, referees in KeepBoth 
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selected the better joke 100% of the time, compared with only 45% in 
KeepWinner (p=.003, Mann-Whitney).  
These findings are confirmed by the regression of column (3) in Table 4, where 
we included data from both treatments and interacted the quality and bribe 
variables with a dummy for treatment KeepBoth. The interaction terms confirm 
that when bribes are unequal, the effect of quality is significantly larger in 
treatment KeepBoth, whereas the effect of bribes is smaller. Further, in cases in 
which bribes were equal, the importance of quality was approximately the same in 
both treatments.
5
  
In Appendix A2, we report additional analyses in which investigate the effect of 
absolute bribe size and explore whether receiving one or two bribes affected 
behavior. We find that referees behaved similarly irrespective of absolute size or 
the number of bribes received.  
Another interesting piece of information from our data comes from referees’ 
evaluations of the quality of the two jokes. In particular, we asked referees in all 
the joke treatments to rate the quality of both jokes on a scale from 0 to 10. This 
measure was not incentivized, so participants had no incentive to lie. Whereas in 
treatment KeepBoth, referees’ evaluation of the jokes is highly correlated with the 
independent raters’ quality measure (r=.513, p<.001, OLS), in treatment 
KeepWinner, this correlation is smaller and not significant (r=.147, p=.194, OLS). 
This treatment difference in the accuracy of referees’ evaluations of quality is 
significant (p=.034, OLS). This suggests that referees in treatment KeepWinner 
may have tried to rationalize their choice ex post and that the bribes distorted their 
quality evaluations. 
                                                          
5
 The reason that the three non-interacted coefficients in column 3 of Table 4 are not exactly identical to the coefficients 
in column 1 is standardization. For column 1, we standardized all coefficients with respect to the standard deviation of the 
explanatory variables in KeepWinner, whereas for column 3 we used the standard deviation for the combined data of 
KeepWinner and KeepBoth. 
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Overall, the results show that referees awarded the prize to the worker with the 
higher bribe in treatment KeepWinner, but selected the one with the better joke in 
treatment KeepBoth. This finding is in line with the greed explanation of bribery. 
When referees are motivated by greed (treatment KeepWinner), they distort their 
judgment. However, when only reciprocity could lead referees to select the higher 
bribe (treatment KeepBoth), they instead select the better joke. This observation 
suggests greed is more important than moral costs, which is in turn more 
important than reciprocity.  
  
C. Additional Treatments 
In this section, we present the results for the six additional treatments. To 
facilitate comparisons across treatments, we pool the data from all treatments into 
a joint regression in Table 5. We use KeepWinner as the reference treatment and 
interact the bribe and quality difference variables with treatment dummies for all 
other treatments. This approach allows us to verify whether bribes and quality 
played a larger or smaller role than in treatment KeepWinner. The corresponding 
figures are presented in Appendix A9.  
  
Rejecting Bribes.—The results of KeepWinnerReject and KeepBothReject 
suggest that allowing referees to reject bribes does not change their behavior. In 
the KeepWinnerReject treatment, referees chose not to keep the winner’s bribe in 
only 10% of the cases. As a consequence, the fraction of winners with the higher 
bribe (100% vs 86%, p=.176, Mann-Whitney) or with the funnier joke (56.7% vs. 
57.1%; p=.978, MW) are similar to those in treatment KeepWinner.  
In treatment KeepBothReject, referees chose to reject both bribes in 10% of the 
cases. As a consequence, the results are similar to the results of treatment 
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KeepBoth: 86% of the referees awarded the prize to the better joke (vs. 90% in 
KeepBoth; p=.626, Mann-Whitney). Referees were less likely to award the prize 
to the worker with the higher bribe than in treatment KeepBoth (36% vs. 64%; 
p=.043, Mann-Whitney), though this effect disappears when controlling for 
quality (as in Table 5).  
The regression results are presented in Table 5. For treatment 
KeepWinnerReject, the only difference relative to KeepWinner is that having a 
larger bribe than the opponent increases the likelihood of winning significantly 
more, which is due to the fact that referees let the higher bribe win 100% of the 
time in this treatment. For treatment KeepBothReject, the coefficients for bribes 
and quality are similar in size to those of treatment KeepBoth, and significantly 
different from those of treatment KeepWinner. 
Overall, the results suggest that allowing referees to reject bribes did not affect 
their behavior. The treatment effects we find within the Reject treatments is very 
similar to the treatment effect we found in the main treatments. Regardless of 
whether they are able to reject the bribes, referees appear motivated by greed, not 
reciprocity. In Appendix A4, we redo our analysis from the previous section with 
the merged data from the reject treatments with the data from the main treatments. 
The analysis reveals that all coefficients estimates are similar, but more precisely 
estimated. As a result, the main treatment comparison for bribes and quality is 
significant at the 1% level.   
Further, allowing referees to reject bribes did not affect worker behavior. There 
are no significant differences in average bribes for either of the two treatments 
(KeepWinnerReject=3.48 vs. KeepWinner=2.80, p=.188, Mann-Whitney; 
KeepBothReject=1.00 vs. KeepBoth=0.90, p=.343, Mann-Whitney).   
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TABLE 5—OLS REGRESSIONS FOR REFEREES IN ADDITIONAL TREATMENTS 
Dependent Variable: Winner (1=Yes) (1) 
Bribe Difference .296*** 
 (.002) 
Bribe Difference X DKeepBoth -.187** 
 (.032) 
Bribe Difference X DKeepWinnerReject .187*** 
 (.006) 
Bribe Difference X DKeepBothReject -.199 
 (.106) 
Bribe Difference X DHighWage -.084 
 (.214) 
Bribe Difference X DNoTask .059 
 (.560) 
Bribe Difference X DObjective -.226** 
 (.042) 
Quality Difference (equal bribes only) .231** 
 (.016) 
Quality Difference (Bribes Equal) X DKeepBoth .137 
 (.162) 
Quality Difference (Bribes Equal) X DKeepWinnerReject -.243 
 (.288) 
Quality Difference (Bribes Equal) X DKeepBothReject -.149 
 (.490) 
Quality Difference (Bribes Equal) X DHighWage -.206 
 (.232) 
Quality Difference (Bribes Equal) X DObjective -.081 
 (.624) 
Quality Difference (Different Bribes) .015 
 (.792) 
Quality Difference (Different Bribes) X DKeepBoth .216** 
 (.016) 
Quality Difference (Different Bribes) X DKeepWinnerReject -.045 
 (.462) 
Quality Difference (Different Bribes) X DKeepBothReject .463*** 
 (.006) 
Quality Difference (Different Bribes) X DHighWage .023 
 (.844) 
Quality Difference (Different Bribes) X DObjective .302** 
 (.014) 
Selected Workers Random 
Treatment Dummies Yes 
Observations 222 
Clusters 111 
Notes: OLS estimates (p-values). P-values are computed using wild bootstraps. The ‘DTreatment’ variables are dummy 
variables for the respective treatments; KeepWinner serves as the reference treatment. The bribe variable and both 
quality variables are standardized using the respective variable’s combined standard deviation over all treatments. We 
randomly select one worker per referee in each round. For other variable definitions, see the notes to Table 4. 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
 
Inequity Aversion.—In KeepWinner, inequity aversion predicts that referees 
should accept the higher bribe, whereas in HighWage, it predicts the opposite. 
However, the higher bribe won 88% of the time, compared with 86% in 
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KeepWinner, and the better-rated joke won 44% of the time, compared with 57% 
in KeepWinner. Neither difference is significant in either non-parametric tests or 
in Table 5. Additionally, the referee chose not to keep the winner’s bribe in only 
7.5% of the cases. These results suggest referees in this treatment behaved 
similarly to referees in treatment KeepWinner, contrary to the prediction of 
inequity aversion. The only difference between the HighWage and the 
KeepWinner treatment relates to workers’ behavior: their average bribe was 
significantly lower in HighWage than in KeepWinner ($1.80 versus $2.80, 
p=.020; Mann-Whitney). 
 
The Importance of Moral Costs of Distortion.—Why are higher bribes ineffective 
in the KeepBoth treatment? One hypothesis is that the moral costs of distorting 
judgment are stronger than reciprocity, and hence referees will ignore the bribes. 
In treatment NoTask, we removed all moral costs of distortion by no longer 
asking referees to judge performance on a task. Hence, we expect reciprocity to 
become more important. 
This is indeed what we find. Whereas the higher bribe won in 64% of the cases 
in treatment KeepBoth, in the NoTask treatment, this fraction significantly 
increases to 94% (p=.044, Mann Whitney). Moreover, 94% is also significantly 
larger than chance (p=.011, Wilcoxon), and not significantly different from 
KeepWinner (p=.614, Mann Whitney). The regression analysis of Table 5 
confirms these results.  
Looking at workers’ behavior (Table 3), we find the average bribe in the 
NoTask treatment ($2.60) was higher than in KeepBoth (p<.0001, Mann-
Whitney) and similar to KeepWinner (p=.697, Mann-Whitney). Additionally, in 
this treatment, the fraction of workers who did not send any bribe is lower than in 
KeepBoth (25% vs. 66%).  
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The comparison between the KeepBoth and the NoTask treatment provides 
further evidence that distorting judgment by rewarding the higher bribe presented 
referees with a moral cost, which previous bribery games did not focus on. 
Referees were happy to award the prize to the worker who sent them more money 
when rewarding them did not require a distortion of their judgment, but did not 
reciprocate the higher bribe when doing so requires them to award the prize to the 
worst performer. Thus, in the absence of moral costs, reciprocity guides referees’ 
behavior. By contrast, in other treatments, the moral costs of distorting judgment 
seem stronger than the norm of reciprocity. 
Similar to treatment NoTask, treatment Objective tests the importance of moral 
costs, but it does so by increasing rather than decreasing them. Having a better 
performance was more effective in the Objective treatment than in the 
KeepWinner treatment (83% vs. 57%, p=.023; Mann-Whitney), whereas it was 
equally effective as in the KeepBoth treatment (83% vs. 90%, p=.312; Mann-
Whitney). Having a higher bribe was neither less effective than in KeepWinner 
(76% vs. 86%, p=.443; Mann-Whitney) nor more effective than in KeepBoth 
(76% vs. 64%, p=.299; Mann-Whitney).  
The fact that both bribes and performance appear to be important may be the 
result of a positive correlation between differences in bribe size and differences in 
performance (r=.31; p=.082, OLS, one-sided.). The regression in Table 5 corrects 
for this correlation. The results show that having a higher bribe than the opponent 
affected the probability of winning significantly less than in the KeepWinner 
treatment. The bribe coefficient is similar to the bribe coefficient estimated for the 
KeepBoth treatment. Similarly, when bribes differed, having a better performance 
mattered significantly more than in the KeepWinner treatment; the coefficient is 
similar to the coefficient of the KeepBoth treatment. Overall, the results suggest 
that moral costs are higher in the Objective treatment, resulting in a larger 
emphasis on quality.  
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V. An Experiment in the Market in Shillong, India 
The results of our experiment show that the mechanism by which bribes distort 
the referees’ decisions is greed and not reciprocity. Here, we complement the 
laboratory evidence with evidence from an experiment in a different, more natural 
setting. Whereas the lab experiments allow us to sharply disentangle between the 
different mechanisms of bribery in a clean setting, the extra-laboratory 
experiment (Charness et al., 2013) allows us to investigate whether our results 
generalize to a population and environment that are more regularly exposed to 
bribery than UC San Diego students.  
V.A. Experimental Design 
We conducted the experiment at the market in the city of Shillong, in the state 
of Meghalaya in northeast India. Bribery and corruption are prevalent in India 
(Transparency International, 2014), and Meghalaya is thought to be among the 
most corrupt states in India (Transparency International India, 2008). 
The goal of this experiment was to investigate the importance of reciprocity 
and greed in a different, more natural setting. For this purpose, we approached 
shoppers at the market and asked them to taste two different pineapples, each 
purchased from a different vendor, and tell us which of the two they thought 
tasted better. In addition to tasting the pineapples, participants (i.e., the shoppers) 
received monetary payments (“bribes”) from the vendors. This set up allows us to 
investigate whether participants chose the higher quality product, or the product 
from the vendor who made them earn more money. As with the joke task in the 
lab experiment, we chose this task because selecting the tastier pineapple is 
partially based on the decision maker’s subjective judgment.  
The procedure of the experiment was as follows. First, we approached two 
fruit vendors in the market, A and B, and invited them to participate in the study. 
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They were both selling pineapples and their stands were not close to each other. 
We explained to the sellers that, if they participated, we would purchase some of 
their pineapples. We told the sellers that we would ask shoppers to taste both their 
pineapple and a pineapple from another seller in the market, and indicate which of 
the two was tastier. We told the sellers that every time a shopper recommended 
their pineapple, we would purchase an additional pineapple from their stand at a 
price of 60 rupees (approximately $1 at the time).  
Each seller agreed to pay some money to each shopper who chose his 
pineapple (other than those in the control treatment, see below). In particular, 
Seller A agreed to pay 10 Rupees and Seller B agreed to pay 20 Rupees. Both 
sellers also agreed that in half of the cases, they would pay these amounts even if 
the shopper did not choose their pineapple.   
We then bought several pineapples from each seller, and selected the two best 
pineapples from seller A (pineapples A1 and A2), and the two worst pineapples 
from seller B (pineapples B1 and B2). For this purpose, four experimenters tasted 
each of the pineapples we bought. We chose the four pineapples such that all four 
experimenters thought pineapple A1 was tastier than pineapple B1, and pineapple 
A2 was tastier than pineapple B2. We then cut each selected pineapple into small 
pieces that we placed in separate bowls. 
Determining the combination of quality and “bribes” in this way implies that 
the better tasting pineapple (A1, A2) was always matched to the lower bribe (10 
Rupees).  In this way, a trade-off between quality and bribes always existed, 
increasing the power of our study. Further, this procedure ensured that all 
participants received the same combination of quality and bribes. 
We then randomly approached 120 market visitors (shoppers) in the market, 
one by one. We asked each shopper whether he or she was willing to help us taste 
a sample from two different pineapples, and tell us which of the two they thought 
tasted better. The experiment was conducted by two research assistants, a male 
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and a female. The first 60 participants tasted pineapple A1 and pineapple B1; the 
other 60 participants tasted pineapple A2 and pineapple B2. The procedure for the 
first and the second group was the same.  
We conducted three treatments, with 40 participants in each (20 for each set of 
pineapples). The first treatment was a control treatment with no bribes, whereas 
the other two were analogous to treatments KeepWinner and KeepBoth. The 
shoppers who were approached in the market for our task were never informed 
that they were taking part in an experiment.  
In the Control treatment, we asked the research assistants to follow the 
following script. After approaching the participant, we asked them to tell the 
participant the following (translated to the local language--Khasi):  “Thank you 
for agreeing to help us. We will pay you 10 Rupees for your time. We would like 
to ask you to tell us which of these two pineapples is tastier. It is important for us 
because we will buy an extra pineapple from the seller who sold us the one you 
will tell us is tastier. Please taste both and tell us which one is tastier.”  
The research assistants then asked participants to taste both pineapples and 
indicate which one was tastier. Participants received their payment of 10 Rupees 
after making their choice. During the experiment, research assistants were 
instructed to switch the hands in which they were holding the bowls after each 
participant, and always start the tasting with the bowl on the left hand. In this way, 
we counterbalanced any order effect.  
Treatment KeepWinner was similar to the control treatment, but instead of 
paying participants 10 Rupees for tasting the pineapples we told them seller A had 
offered 10 Rupees to those who chose his pineapple, and seller B had offered 20 
Rupees to those who chose his pineapple. Participants were also told they could 
only keep the money offered by the seller of the pineapple that they indicated as 
tastier. The following additional wording was added to the script before we asked 
participants to taste the pineapples: “The seller of this pineapple [the RA holding 
37 
 
the bowls raised the bowl containing pineapple A1 or A2] offered you 10 Rupees 
if you will choose his pineapple, and the seller of this pineapple [now the bowl 
containing pineapple B1 or B2 was raised] offered 20 Rupees to you if you will 
choose his pineapple. As a result, you will be paid 10 Rupees if you choose this 
one and 20 Rupees if you choose this one [again, the respective bowls were 
raised].” Participants then tasted both pineapples, chose one, and were paid 
according to their choice. 
Treatment KeepBoth was similar to treatment KeepWinner, but participants 
were told that regardless of their choice, they would be paid both the 10 Rupees 
offered by seller A and the 20 Rupees offered by seller B. Specifically, the 
protocol was as follows: “The seller of this pineapple [the RA holding the bowls 
raised the bowl containing pineapple A1 or A2] offered you 10 Rupees and the 
seller of this pineapple [the bowl containing pineapple B1 or B2 was raised] 
offered 20 Rupees. As a result, you will be paid 30 Rupees regardless of your 
choice.” Participants then tasted both pineapples, chose one, and received their 
payment.  
V.B. Results 
The results are presented in Figure 3. In the control treatment, 77.5% of the 
participants indicated pineapple A was tastier. This fraction is significantly larger 
than predicted by chance (i.e., 50%, p<.001, test of proportions), which suggests 
that pineapple A was indeed tastier than pineapple B. Thus, in this treatment, most 
participants agreed with the experimenters about which of the two pineapples was 
tastier.  
In treatment KeepWinner, participants chose pineapple A only 35% of the time. 
The difference between the fraction of participants choosing pineapple A in 
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KeepWinner and in the control treatment is significant (p<.001, test of 
proportions). 
In treatment KeepBoth, the fraction of participants choosing pineapple A was 
67.5%, which is significantly higher than the fraction observed in the 
KeepWinner treatment (p=.003, test of proportions), and does not differ from the 
control treatment (p=.317, test of proportions). 
 
 
FIGURE 3. THE FRACTION OF PARTICIPANTS WHO CHOOSE THE TASTIER PINEAPPLE (A) BY TREATMENT 
  
We further explore these results using OLS regressions in which we estimate 
treatment effects on the probability of choosing pineapple A. Since observations 
are not clustered, we use robust standard errors to compute the p-values. The 
regression (Table 6) confirms that participants in KeepWinner were significantly 
less likely to choose the tastier pineapple than participants in the control treatment. 
Participants in KeepBoth are not significantly less likely to choose the tastier 
pineapple than participants in the control treatment. The difference between the 
KeepWinner and the KeepBoth coefficients is also significant (F(1,117)=9.22, 
p=.003). In column (2), we interact the particular pineapple that was tasted by the 
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subjects with treatment dummies. We find that the treatment effect is similar 
regardless of the particular combination of pineapples that was tasted.  
 
TABLE 6—OLS REGRESSIONS FOR THE EXTRA-LABORATORY EXPERIMENT IN INDIA 
Dependent Variable: Pineapple A Wins (1=Yes) 
 (1) (2) 
   
Constant .775 .750 
 (.000) (.000) 
DKeepWinner -.425*** -.400*** 
 (.000) (.008) 
DKeepBoth -.100 -.050 
 (.322) (.730) 
Pineapple A2/B2  .050 
  (.712) 
Pineapple A2/B2 X DKeepWinner  -.050 
  (.808) 
Pineapple A2/B2 X DKeepBoth  -.100 
  (.624) 
   
Observations 120 120 
   
Notes: OLS estimates (p-values). The dependent variable is a dummy that specifies whether the referee selected the best-
tasting pineapple (A) as the winner. DKeepWinner and DKeepBoth are dummy variables that are equal to one for KeepWinner 
and KeepBoth respectively, and zero otherwise. Pineapple A2/B2 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the 
Pineapples tasted were Pineapple A2 and B2, and equal to zero if the pineapples tasted were A1 and B1. The control 
treatment serves as the reference treatment. P-values are calculated using robust standard errors.  
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks  
Bribery is widespread and has an important impact on how decisions are made 
in politics, business, sports, education, and many other domains, with large 
economic consequences. Despite some economic arguments that bribes are not 
necessarily bad for society but are simply used to “grease the wheels” of 
bureaucracy (e.g., Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968), even in these cases, when 
bureaucrats can endogenously choose the level of corruption, bribes clearly have a 
negative effect on economic efficiency (Banerjee, 1997). 
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The purpose of the current paper is to investigate the relative importance of 
greed and social preferences in distorting choices in the presence of bribery. We 
find that when incentives are contingent on choices, individuals accept and reward 
bribes: in our experiments, referees systematically rewarded the higher bribe 
when they could only keep the winner’s bribe. However, when bribes were not 
contingent on delivering a certain outcome, individuals did not distort judgment. 
This finding supports the greed explanation of bribery. The extra-laboratory 
experiment we conducted in the market in India confirms the results we observed 
in San Diego, outside of the lab and with a population that is more accustomed to 
bribery. 
Our experiments show that the norm of reciprocity seems to be weaker than the 
moral costs of distorting judgment, which are weaker than profit maximization. 
Our ability to rank these different forces comes from the experimental bribery 
game that we introduce, which is able to capture the moral costs associated with 
distortion of judgment that is generated when bribes, rather than performance, are 
rewarded. We find that distortion plays an important role in explaining whether 
referees reciprocate the higher bribe. When the decision of which worker wins a 
prize does not involve a distortion of judgment (as in treatment NoTask), we find 
that individuals are happy to reciprocate the higher bribe. Further, we find that 
increasing the moral costs of distortion by providing a more objective task (as in 
treatment Objective) makes referee less likely to go along with the higher bribe 
and more likely to choose based on quality. These results thus show that capturing 
distortion in bribery experiments is important because moral costs of distortion 
have an important influence on the behavior of participants.  
Our investigation of the motives that induce decision makers to accept and 
reward bribes provides insights into how to better target anti-corruption 
interventions. One implication is that anti-corruption policies designed to reduce 
the effectiveness of reciprocity (such as reducing social ties and increasing 
41 
 
anonymity) may not be effective. If greed drives behavior, as our results suggest, 
policy interventions that enforce monetary sanctions may be more effective in 
preventing corruption.   
Policy interventions that focus on increasing the moral costs of distortion may 
provide an alternative way to reduce bribery. In a related paper (Gneezy, 
Saccardo, Serra-Garcia, and Van Veldhuizen, 2015), we examine the role of self-
deception in distorting judgment, by varying when evaluators are informed about 
their incentives to recommend one of two options either before or after their 
initial private judgment. When the information regarding the incentives is 
provided before (as in treatment KeepWinner here), we find a significant bias in 
judgment in the direction of the incentive. However, when the information is 
provided after they privately evaluate the options, the bias in judgment is 
significantly reduced. In other words, limiting self-deception may increase the 
moral costs of distortion, which limits the effectiveness of bribery. 
Future research could build on our game and findings in at least two other 
important ways. First, in our experiment, workers who lost because of bribery 
suffered the negative externality of distorted justice. This negative externality did 
not reduce the overall wealth of the participants. In many real-world cases of 
bribery, however, the negative externality could be much larger and reduce the 
overall earnings. Our game could be extended by incorporating a negative 
externality (e.g., Falk and Szech, 2013) into the design or by making bribery 
welfare decreasing. 
Second, a future design could study how the chance of being audited and 
penalized for accepting bribes affects decisions. Our investigation of bribery 
focused on the case in which the decision of who wins the prize is subjective, in 
which implementing monitoring and punishment mechanisms is often hard, 
because of the subjective nature of the choice. Future research could focus on the 
case in which decision makers have to make decisions that are easily and 
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objectively verifiable, and use this design to study the interplay between the 
probability of being caught and the size of the penalty, and how this interplay 
affects the decision to offer or accept a bribe. 
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Appendix A FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION 
A1. The Determinants of Bribing Behavior  
 
TABLE A1—DETERMINANTS OF BRIBE AMOUNT AND JOKE QUALITY 
Dependent Variable:  Bribe Amount Joke Quality Obj. Score 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Joke Quality .066   
 (.554)   
Objective Score .034   
 (.130)   
Confidence -.034 .794** 31.88** 
 (.940) (.016) (.028) 
Female -.417* -.051 9.73** 
 (.088) (.778) (.034) 
Nonnative speaker .802** -.539** 2.99 
 (.024) (.038) (.818) 
Not of Asian Ethnicity .370 .347** -6.18 
 (.114) (.050) (.270) 
Age .138** -.081* -1.75 
 (.036) (.078) (.138) 
Economics Major -.168 .137 7.08 
 (.660) (.556) (.246) 
Psychology Major .169 .199 -8.33 
 (.688) (.502) (.218) 
Engineering/Science Major .183 -.192 6.35 
 (.610) (.436) (.288) 
Other Social Science Major -.890** .054 6.91 
 (.038) (.894) (.312) 
Humanities Major -.252 .119 -8.07 
 (.582) (.568) (.192) 
    
Treatment Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Treatment All Treatments All Joke Objective 
  Treatments  
Observations 484 320 84 
Clusters 242 160 42 
Notes: OLS estimates (p-values). Bribe amount is the bribe amount sent by the worker. Joke quality is the 
average rating of the joke by the independent judges. Objective score is the worker’s score on the objective task. 
Confidence is the worker’s confidence in having a better joke than the other worker. The remaining variables 
are dummies for females, nonnative speakers, and non-Asians, a continuous variable for age, and dummies for 
different majors, respectively (the omitted groups are biology/chemistry majors and undeclared majors). P-
values (in brackets) are calculated using wild bootstraps. 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
 
In this section, we investigate whether worker-level characteristics are 
predictive of bribe size. For example, workers who wrote inferior jokes (or 
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performed worse on the objective task) might have sent higher bribes. Similarly, 
some of the demographic variables reported in Table 2 might be predictive of how 
much a worker decides to bribe.  
To check which variables are predictive of bribe size, we regressed bribe size 
on performance on the task, the confidence question, and all of the demographic 
variables reported in Table 2, where we use biology/chemistry majors as the 
reference group. We pooled the data from all treatments to have the largest 
possible sample size. The regression results are reported in Table A1 (column 1).  
Overall, we find that the coefficient for joke quality (or the performance on the 
objective task) is not significantly different from zero, suggesting that overall the 
quality of workers’ performance did not affect their bribing behavior. Further, the 
coefficient for workers’ beliefs about having a better joke than the opponent is 
also not significant. These coefficients remain insignificant even if we only 
include either actual quality or the beliefs in the regression.  
Our analysis further reveals that non-native speakers, older participants, and 
men send higher bribes, whereas social science majors (not including economists 
and psychologists) send smaller bribes.  
Table A1 also presents the results of the analysis on the determinants of joke 
quality. Columns (2) and (3) show that a correlation exists between joke quality 
(or performance in the objective task) and workers’ belief that they will win the 
prize. The regressions further show that native speakers and subjects that did not 
have an Asian ethnicity wrote better-quality jokes, and that women performed 
better in the objective task.  
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A2. Differences in Bribes 
A feature of our design is that although treatment is randomized and workers 
are randomly paired within sessions, bribes are not determined at random. To 
analyze referees’ behavior and make treatment comparisons, the referees must 
face similar combinations of bribes across treatments. That is, whenever a referee 
receives two bribes of different size, the distribution of the difference between the 
two bribes must be similar across both treatments. In the result sections, we 
showed that, despite the average bribe being significantly higher in KeepWinner, 
the difference between bribes was indeed similar in treatment KeepWinner and 
treatment KeepBoth.  
However, referees in treatment KeepWinner are more likely to face two bribes 
rather than one. Further, referees in treatment KeepWinner are more likely to have 
to choose between two large bribes (e.g., $5 and $3) than referees in treatment 
KeepBoth. We will discuss these two differences below and provide evidence 
suggesting that the respective differences cannot explain our results. 
  
One Bribe versus Two Bribes. Referees were more likely to receive two bribes 
(e.g., $5 versus $2) in treatment KeepWinner than in treatment KeepBoth. Indeed, 
of all the times they received bribes of different sizes, referees in KeepBoth 
received only one bribe (e.g., 3$ vs. $0) 82% of the time, versus only 41% for the 
referees in the KeepWinner treatment. To correct for this difference, we re-
estimate regressions of Table 4 by including separate coefficients for the two-
bribes and one-bribe case for both quality and bribes. This approach allows us to 
compare the importance of bribes and quality between cases in which referees 
received one or two bribes, respectively. 
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TABLE A2—OLS REGRESSIONS FOR REFEREES ONE OR TWO BRIBES POSITIVE 
Dependent Variable: Winner (1=Yes) 
 (1) (2) 
Bribe difference .330** .131* 
 [One bribe positive] (.022) (.082) 
Quality difference (bribes differ) .066 .236** 
 [One bribe positive] (.416) (.036) 
   
Bribe difference .280*** .128 
 [Both bribes positive] (.002) (.140) 
Quality difference (bribes differ) -.056 .646 
 [Both bribes positive] (.630) (.162) 
   
Quality difference (bribes identical) .342** .273** 
 (.022) (.022) 
Treatment KeepWinner KeepBoth 
Selected Workers Random Random 
Observations 40 40 
Clusters 20 20 
Notes: OLS estimates (p-values). The dependent variable is a dummy that specifies whether the selected worker was 
selected as the winner. For other variable definitions, see the notes to Table 4. Separate coefficients are included for 
cases in which one bribe is positive and in which both bribes are positive. P-values (in brackets) are calculated using 
wild bootstraps. We randomly select one worker per referee in each round. 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
 
Table A2 presents the results. For the KeepWinner treatment, the coefficients 
for bribes are significant and nearly identical in both cases. Similarly, the 
coefficient for quality is small and not significant in either case. This finding 
suggests that within treatment, KeepWinner referees do not react differently to 
bribery in the one-bribe versus two-bribes case. 
Treatment KeepBoth does not have enough observations with two different 
bribes for us to estimate the coefficients for the two-bribes case with any 
precision. For the one-bribe case, the coefficient for bribes is slightly larger than 
the coefficient in Table 4 and is significant at the 10% level. At the same time, the 
(standardized) coefficient for quality is still nearly twice as large as the 
(standardized) coefficient for bribes, suggesting that quality played a larger role in 
the referee’s decision making. Further, the comparison with the KeepWinner 
treatment shows the coefficient for bribe difference in KeepBoth is 60% smaller 
than the coefficient for KeepWinner, whereas the coefficient for quality is 
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substantially larger. These results are similar to the results of Table 4. Thus, the 
treatment difference between KeepWinner and KeepBoth does not appear to have 
been the result of referees being more likely to receive only one bribe in the 
KeepBoth treatment. 
 
Absolute Bribe Size.—A related difference between KeepWinner and KeepBoth 
that arises from the fact that bribes in our experiment are not determined at 
random is that referees in KeepWinner are more likely to face two relatively large 
bribes. Referees might respond differently to receiving two large bribes than to 
receiving two smaller ones, even when the difference in bribes is the same. 
Explaining our treatment effect would require that referees care more about a 
difference of $5 vs. $4 than $2 vs. $1, as could be the case if referees are more 
willing to reward a bribe when the absolute value of the bribe is high (note, 
however, that the converse argument could also be made). 
To check whether this was indeed the case, we redid the regressions of Table 4 
while controlling for the sum of the two bribes. We also interact the sum variable 
with the bribe-difference variable. The estimate for the interaction effect tells us 
whether bribes had a larger (or smaller) role when the sum of the two bribes was 
larger. 
Table A3 shows the results. The interaction effect is not significant for either 
treatment. If anything, the coefficient estimate for the KeepBoth treatment 
(p=.234) suggests referees care less about bribes as the sum of the two bribes 
increases, which would increase the size of the treatment difference. Thus, 
overall, we find no evidence that differences in absolute bribe size can explain our 
treatment effect. 
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TABLE A3—OLS REGRESSIONS FOR REFEREES WITH ABSOLUTE BRIBE SIZE 
Dependent Variable: Winner (1=Yes) 
 (1) (2) 
Bribe difference .327*** .110 
 (.000) (.278) 
Quality difference (bribes differ) -.012 .291** 
 (.904) (.012) 
Quality difference (bribes identical) .365** .274** 
 (.016) (.022) 
Sum of the two bribes .066 .083 
 (.376) (.362) 
Bribe Difference X Sum of the two bribes .031 -.130 
 (.802) (.234) 
Treatment KeepWinner KeepBoth 
Selected Workers Random Random 
Observations 40 40 
Clusters 20 20 
Notes: OLS estimates (p-values). The dependent variable is a dummy that specifies whether the selected worker was 
selected as the winner. The sum of the two bribes is the sum of the bribes of both workers in the pair. For other variable 
definitions, see the notes to Table 4. P-values (in brackets) are calculated using wild bootstraps. We randomly select one 
worker per referee in each round. 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
  
A3. The Quality Threshold 
All non-parametric tests in the main text that relate to quality use only those 
pairs of jokes in which at least 65.1% of independent raters agreed on the winner. 
With this threshold, the fraction of independent raters who selected a given joke 
over the other is significantly different from chance (i.e., 50%) at the 10% level 
by a test of proportions. 
In this section, we redo the main analysis using a more stringent threshold of 
69.4%, which entails that the two jokes are significantly different at the 5% level 
(test of proportions, Z=1.65, n=18, p=.050). The table below summarizes the non-
parametric results. The results are very similar for both thresholds. A slight 
difference is that the comparison between the KeepWinner and KeepBoth 
treatment is significant at the 1% level for the 65.1% threshold and at the 5% level 
for the more stringent threshold, which is largely due to a loss of observations. 
Similarly, the difference between KeepWinner and KeepBothReject is no longer 
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significant, because of a lack of observations, although the result is still very 
similar and not significantly different from KeepBoth (p=.611, Mann-Whitney). 
 
TABLE A4—NON-PARAMETRIC TESTS FOR ALTERNATIVE THRESHOLD 
 Better Quality Wins (%) Difference vs. KeepWinner 
Treatment               Threshold: 65.1% 69.4% 65.1% 69.4% 
KeepWinner 56.7% 60.0%   
 (.564) (.405)   
KeepBoth 90.5% 88.9% 33.80 28.90 
 (.001) (.002) (.004) (.030) 
KeepWinnerReject 57.1% 58.3% 0.40 -1.70 
 (.655) (.655) (.978) (.852) 
KeepBothReject 90.5% 81.8% 33.80 21.80 
 (.005) (.014) (.026) (.119) 
HighWage 44.0% 40.9% -12.70 -19.10 
 (.593) (.564) (.439) (.331) 
Objective 83.3% 86.4% 26.60 26.40 
 (.001) (.001) (.023) (.023) 
     
Notes: Percentages (P-values). The first two columns display the percentage of times the best joke won for each 
treatment, for a given threshold. The last two columns display the difference between the percentage of winners between 
the respective treatment and treatment KeepWinner. In both cases, two different thresholds are used. For the 65.1% 
threshold, the two jokes in a pair differ significantly at the 10% level by a test of proportions; for the 69.4% threshold, 
the two jokes differ significantly from each other at the 5% level. P-values are computed using Wilcoxon tests and a 
Mann-Whitney tests for columns 1 and 2 and columns 3 and 4 respectively. 
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A4. Alternative Regression Specifications and Demographic Controls 
For our main regressions (Table 4 and Table 5), we selected one worker per pair 
at random for each given round and then investigated how differences in quality 
and bribes between the selected worker and the opponent affect winning. Table 
A5 provides the results of two alternative specifications, which we first estimate 
separately for the two main treatments. 
In regression (1) and (2), we focus on the workers who submitted a larger bribe 
than their opponent in a given round. We then investigate whether for those 
workers, increasing the quality of the joke relative to the opponent further 
increased their likelihood of winning. In treatment KeepWinner, the higher bribe 
already wins 86% of the time. Hence, increasing the quality of the worker’s joke 
(relative to the opponent) does not further increase the likelihood of winning. By 
contrast, in treatment KeepBoth (column 2), the higher bribe only wins 64% of 
the time, and increasing the relative quality of the worker’s joke is highly 
beneficial. These results are in line with the results in the main text: quality 
matters in treatment KeepBoth, but not in treatment KeepWinner.  
 
TABLE A5—ALTERNATIVE OLS REGRESSIONS FOR KEEPWINNER AND KEEPBOTH 
Dependent Variable: Winner (1=Yes) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Bribe Difference   .270** .014 
   (.032) (.518) 
Quality Difference (bribes differ) .060 .275**   
 (.254) (.018)   
     
Treatment KeepWinner KeepBoth KeepWinner KeepBoth 
     Selected Workers Higher Bribe Higher Bribe Higher Quality Higher Quality 
     
Observations 29 22 30 21 
     
Clusters 16 12 18 17 
     
Notes: OLS estimates (p-values). The dependent variable is a dummy that specifies whether the selected worker was 
selected as the winner. For other variable definitions, see the notes to Table 4.  P-values are calculated using wild 
bootstraps. For specification (1) and (2), we select only workers with a higher bribe than their opponent in the given 
round. For specification (3) and (4), we select only workers with a better-quality joke than their opponent in the given 
round. We consider a joke to be of better quality when the agreement of the independent raters is at least 65.1%.  
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
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In regression (3) and (4), we instead focus on the workers who wrote the better 
joke in a given round, and investigate whether larger differences in bribes 
between those worker and their opponents make the workers even more likely to 
win the prize. The results show that for workers who already have the best joke in 
the pair, bribes have a strong positive effect on the likelihood of winning in 
treatment KeepWinner, but not in treatment KeepBoth. Thus, similar to the 
regressions presented in the main text, bribes matter in treatment KeepWinner but 
not in treatment KeepBoth.  
In Table A6 we estimate the regressions reported in Table A5 jointly for all 
treatments. We report four regressions. In columns (1) and (2), we use 
KeepWinner as the reference treatment and interact the bribe and quality-
difference variables with treatment dummies for all other treatments. This 
approach allows us to verify whether bribes and quality played a larger or smaller 
role than in treatment KeepWinner. Columns (3) and (4) are similar to columns 
(1) and (2) but also include a series of demographic control variables. In 
particular, we add controls for all the demographic variables reported in Table 2 
and for the round.
6  
The results largely replicate the main results from Table 5. Relative to 
KeepWinner, bribes play a less important role in KeepBoth and KeepBothReject, 
whereas quality plays a larger role in these treatments and treatment Objective. In 
addition, including demographic controls does not substantially affect the 
coefficient estimates. In particular, p-values are very similar across both 
specifications. 
  
                                                          
6
 We could not control for demographics in the regressions presented in the main text. When workers are randomly 
selected, selected workers have a 50% chance of winning, irrespective of the referee’s demographics, and hence all 
demographic variable coefficients are zero in expectation. 
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TABLE A6—ALTERNATIVE OLS REGRESSIONS FOR ALL TREATMENTS 
Dependent Variable: Winner (1=Yes) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bribe Difference  .265**  .255** 
  (.032)  (.036) 
Bribe Difference X DKeepBoth  -.249***  -.203** 
  (.006)  (.042) 
Bribe Difference X DKeepWinnerReject  .218***  .232** 
  (.006)  (.020) 
Bribe Difference X DKeepBothReject  -.317**  -332** 
  (.012)  (.018) 
Bribe Difference X DHighWage  .013  .035 
  (.892)  (.766) 
Bribe Difference X DObjective  -.168  -.191 
  (.142)  (.128) 
     
     
Quality Difference (Different Bribes) .060  .067  
 (.254)  (.258)  
Quality Difference (Different Bribes)  X DKeepBoth .181**  .211**  
 (.032)  (.008)  
Quality Difference (Different Bribes)  X DKeepWinnerReject -.060  -.041  
 (.274)  (.494)  
Quality Difference (Different Bribes)  X DKeepBothReject .381**  .390**  
 (.012)  (.014)  
Quality Difference (Different Bribes)  X DHighWage -.020  -.052  
 (.832)  (.670)  
Quality Difference (Different Bribes)  X DObjective .228**  .208*  
 (.040)  (.052)  
     
     
Selected Workers Higher Higher Higher Higher 
 Bribe Quality Bribe Quality 
Treatment Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic Controls No No Yes Yes 
Observations 132 134 132 134 
Clusters 79 90 79 90 
Notes: OLS estimates (p-values). P-values are computed using wild bootstraps. The ‘DTreatment’ variables are dummy 
variables for the respective treatments; KeepWinner serves as the reference treatment. Control variables include the 
round and all demographic variables of Table 2, where we use bio/chemistry majors and undeclared majors as the 
reference group. Bribe and quality variables are standardized using the combined standard deviation over all included 
treatments. For other variable definitions and explanation of how we selected the workers in each regression, see the 
notes to Table 4. 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
 
Identical Quality—In the regressions reported in the main text, we estimate 
separate coefficients for quality when bribes are equal and when bribes differ. 
Here, we present a similar analysis in which we also estimate separate coefficients 
for bribes when quality is equal (using the 65.1% threshold) and when quality 
differs. The latter coefficient allows us to focus on cases in which quality differs, 
which is where a larger treatment difference should be expected. We do not use 
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this approach in the main text because the threshold between ‘similar’ jokes and 
different jokes is not as clear-cut as the threshold between identical and non-
identical bribes.  
Table A7 reports the results. For treatment KeepWinner, bribes have a larger 
effect when quality is equal and therefore cannot influence judgment. Similarly, 
in treatment KeepBoth, the coefficient for bribes is larger when quality is equal, 
though it is still not significant. The interaction terms in column (3) shows that the 
treatment difference in the importance of bribes overall seems to be largely driven 
by cases in which quality differs, as expected. These results indeed suggest that 
bribes play a larger role when quality is equal in both treatments.  
 
TABLE A7—OLS REGRESSIONS FOR REFEREES WITH SEPARATE BRIBE COEFFICIENTS 
Dependent Variable: Winner (1=Yes) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Bribe Difference (quality identical) .453** .171 .348** 
 (.016) (.180) (.016) 
Bribe Difference (quality differs) .267** .033 .254** 
 (.032) (.458) (.032) 
Quality Difference (bribes differ) .009 .270** .010 
 (.894) (.020) (.894) 
Quality Difference (bribes identical) .339** .276** .257** 
 (.012) (.034) (.012) 
DKeepBoth   .024 
   (.862) 
Bribe Difference (quality identical) X DKeepBoth   -.145 
   (.274) 
Bribe Difference (quality differs) X DKeepBoth   -.216** 
   (.024) 
Quality Difference (bribes differ) X DKeepBoth   .234*** 
   (.008) 
Quality Difference (bribes identical) X DKeepBoth   .151 
   (.164) 
Treatment KeepWinner KeepBoth KeepWinner 
   KeepBoth 
Selected Workers Random Random Random 
Observations 40 40 80 
Clusters 20 20 40 
Notes: OLS estimates (p-values). The dependent variable is a dummy that specifies whether the selected worker was 
selected as the winner.  For other variable definitions, see the notes to Table 4. P-values (in brackets) are calculated 
using wild bootstraps. We consider jokes to be of identical quality when fewer than 65.1% of independent raters agree 
on the winner. We randomly select one worker per referee in each round. 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
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Main and Reject treatments. The analysis of treatment KeepWinnerReject and 
KeepBothReject reported in the main text reveals that giving referees the 
opportunity to reject bribes did not change their behavior, as compared to 
treatment KeepWinner and KeepBoth respectively. As an additional robustness 
check for the results presented in Table 4, we can therefore merge the data of 
Reject treatments and the main treatments and redo the analysis with the merged 
data. The results (Table A8) are very similar to Table 4. Referees in treatment 
KeepWinner select the highest bribe as the winner, whereas referees in treatment 
KeepBoth select the best joke.  The main difference with Table 4  is that the main 
treatment comparisons are now significant at the 1% level, which is due to the 
larger sample size used.  
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TABLE A8—OLS REGRESSIONS FOR REFEREES IN KEEPWINNER AND KEEPBOTH INCLUDING REJECT TREATMENTS 
Dependent Variable: Winner (1=Yes) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Bribe Difference .337*** .052 .311*** 
 (.000) (.274) (.000) 
Quality Difference  (bribes differ) .006 .318*** .006 
 (.866) (.002) (.866) 
Quality Difference  (bribes identical) .257* .219** .197* 
 (.054) (.012) (.054) 
DKeepBoth   .050 
   (.564) 
Bribe Difference X DKeepBoth   -.252*** 
   (.002) 
Quality Difference X DKeepBoth   .301*** 
(bribes differ)   (.002) 
Quality Difference X DKeepBoth   .089 
(bribes identical)   (.448) 
    
Treatment KeepWinner KeepBoth KeepWinner 
   KeepBoth 
Selected Workers Random Random Random 
    
Observations 60 60 120 
    
Clusters 30 30 60 
    
Notes: OLS estimates (p-values). The dependent variable is a dummy that specifies whether the selected worker was 
selected as the winner. Quality Difference is the difference between the quality of the joke (i.e., the average rating by the 
independent raters) of the selected worker and the quality of the joke of the other worker in the pair. Bribe Difference is 
the difference between the bribe sent by the selected worker and the bribe sent by the other worker in the pair. DKeepBoth 
is a dummy that is equal to one for treatment KeepBoth, and zero otherwise. For column (3), the bribe variable and both 
quality variables are standardized using the respective variable’s combined standard deviation over all included 
treatments. P-values are calculated using wild bootstraps. For each regression, we randomly select one worker per 
referee in each round.  
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
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A5. Robustness Check: Alternatives to the Wild Bootstrap 
 
In the main regression analysis, we computed p-values using wild bootstraps, 
as suggested by Cameron et al. (2008). In this section, as a robustness check, we 
provide the results of several alternative techniques, which we use to compute the 
p-values of the KeepWinner and KeepBoth treatment regressions reported in 
Table 4. 
We use four different techniques. The first is the wild bootstrap procedure, 
which we use in the main text. Cameron et al. (2008) show that this approach 
(which they refer to as the “wild bootstrap-t” procedure) leads to more 
consistently accurate (and more conservative) rejection rates than alternative 
approaches, and therefore recommend its use in case of a small number of 
clusters. For more details on how the technique works, see Cameron et al. (2008). 
For column (2), we recalculate our p-values using clustered standard errors, a 
standard approach in experimental economics. For column (3), we use a non-
parametric bootstrap, which is, to our knowledge, the most widely used bootstrap 
method in experimental economics. Finally, we also redo the main regressions 
using probit (with clustered standard errors). 
The top half of Table A9 reports the results for treatment KeepWinner; the 
lower half presents the results for treatment KeepBoth. Each column presents the 
results of a different estimation technique. Column (1) reports the results of Table 
4. The other columns show that alternative estimation techniques result in very 
similar p-values. In particular, bribes are significant at the 1% level across 
specifications, and quality (for different bribes) is never significant in any 
specification. The only difference is that quality (for equal bribes) is significant at 
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the 5% level with the wild bootstrap, but significant at the 1% level in all other 
specifications.7 
For KeepBoth, the results are also very similar across specifications. Bribes are 
not significant, and quality (for different bribes) is significant at the 1% level in 
all specifications. As with KeepWinner, the main difference is that the quality 
variable for equal bribes is significant at the 5% level in the wild bootstrap and 
probit, but at the 1% level in the other specifications. 
 
TABLE A9—SEPARATE OLS REGRESSIONS WITH ALTERNATIVE P-VALUE ESTIMATES FOR MAIN TREATMENTS 
Dependent Variable: Winner (1=Yes) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(KeepWinner)     
Bribe Difference .308*** .308*** .308*** .488*** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Quality Difference (bribes differ) .014 .014 .014 .054 
 (.762) (.794) (.830) (.619) 
Quality Difference (bribes identical) .336** .336*** .336*** .526*** 
 (.020) (.000) (.002) (.002) 
     
(KeepBoth)     
Bribe Difference .086 .086 .086 .154 
 (.140) (.161) (.222) (.205) 
Quality Difference (bribes differ) .262** .262*** .262*** .613*** 
 (.010) (.001) (.004) (.005) 
Quality Difference (bribes identical) .275** .275*** .275*** .420** 
 (.022) (.000) (.001) (.012) 
     
Selected Workers Random Random Random Random 
Technique OLS OLS OLS Probit 
    (Marg. Eff.) 
P-Values Wild BS Clustered SE Non-Par BS Clustered SE 
     
Observations 40 40 40 40 
Clusters 20 20 20 20 
Notes: Regression estimates (p-values). Each column presents the results of two regressions, which for the top and 
bottom panel are analogous to regressions 1 and 2 in Table 4, respectively. For variable definitions and other details, see 
Table 4 and its notes. Columns (1)-(3) use OLS, column (4) uses probit. P-values are computed either by wild bootstrap 
(column (1)), clustered standard errors (column (2) and (4)) or a non-parametric bootstrap (column (3)).  
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
 
Table A10 presents the regression with interaction effects (column (3) in Table 
4). We do not estimate the probit model here, because interaction terms are 
                                                          
7
 The marginal-effect estimates for probit are typically larger than the coefficient estimates of OLS, which is the result of the marginal 
effect being estimated at the sample average, where the probability of winning is approximately .5.  
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difficult to interpret with marginal effects. Similar to Table A8, the p-values are 
quite robust with respect to the estimation technique we use.  
Overall, the wild bootstrap technique and alternatives yield similar p-values in 
both Table A9 and A10. If anything, the wild bootstrap tends to be the most 
conservative technique, which is in line with Cameron et al. (2008). 
 
TABLE A10—JOINT OLS REGRESSIONS WITH ALTERNATIVE P-VALUE ESTIMATES FOR MAIN TREATMENTS 
Dependent Variable: Winner (1=Yes) (1) (2) (3) 
    
Bribe Difference .274*** .274*** .274*** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Quality Difference (bribes differ) .015 .015 .015 
 (.762) (.791) (.839) 
Quality Difference (bribes identical) .255** .255*** .255*** 
 (.020) (.000) (.005) 
DKeepBoth .008 .008 .008 
 (.980) (.942) (.947) 
Bribe Difference X DKeepBoth -.173** -.173** -.173* 
 (.032) (.035) (.058) 
Quality Difference X DKeepBoth .222** .222*** .222** 
(bribes differ) (.014) (.009) (.049) 
Quality Difference X DKeepBoth .150 .150 .150 
(bribes identical) (.156) (.142) (.320) 
    
Treatment KeepWinner KeepWinner KeepWinner 
 KeepBoth KeepBoth KeepBoth 
Selected Workers Random Random Random 
    
Technique OLS OLS OLS 
    
P-Values Wild BS Clustered SE Non-Par BS 
    
Observations 40 40 40 
Clusters 20 20 20 
Notes: OLS estimates (p-values). Each column presents the results of a single regression, which is analogous to 
regression 3 in Table 4. For variable definitions and other details, see Table 4 and its notes. P-values are computed either 
by wild bootstrap (column (1)), clustered standard errors (column (2)), or a non-parametric bootstrap (column (3)).  
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
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A6. Robustness Check: Alternative Random Samples of Workers 
In our main regression analyses, we randomly selected one worker per referee 
in a given round. We used the same random sample for all regressions. Here, we 
present evidence that shows the results we present do not depend on the particular 
sample of workers we randomly selected. For this purpose, we re-estimate of the 
regressions of Table 4 for 1,000 alternative random samples of workers. In every 
random sample, each referee and round combination is represented exactly once; 
the only thing that differs across samples is whether worker A or worker B is 
included in the analysis (for a given pair and round). 
Table A11 below presents the average resulting coefficient estimates as well as 
the standard deviation of the coefficient estimates (in square brackets). Overall, 
coefficient estimates do not differ much across the different samples. The only 
exception is the dummy for treatment KeepBoth in column (3); this exception is 
due to the random sample sometimes containing more winners for treatment 
KeepBoth than for KeepWinner and vice versa. Overall, the results are very 
robust with respect to the particular random sample selected for these regressions. 
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TABLE A11—OLS REGRESSIONS WITH ALTERNATIVE RANDOM SAMPLES 
Probability (winning) (1) (2) (3) 
    
Bribe Difference 0.304 0.092 0.275 
 [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] 
Quality Difference (bribes differ) 0.014 0.253 0.014 
 [0.011] [0.019] [0.012] 
Quality Difference (bribes identical) 0.341 0.274 0.251 
 [0.028] [0.020] [0.015] 
DKeepBoth   -0.004 
   [0.095] 
Bribe Difference X DKeepBoth   -0.170 
   [0.017] 
Quality Difference X DKeepBoth   0.222 
(bribes differ)   [0.021] 
Quality Difference X DKeepBoth   0.144 
(bribes identical)   [0.028] 
    
Treatment KeepWinner KeepBoth KeepWinner 
   KeepBoth 
    
Observations 40 40 80 
    
Clusters 20 20 40 
    
Notes: OLS estimates [standard deviations]. For each column, we re-estimate the regression of, respectively, columns 
(1), (2), and (3) of Table 4 1,000 times. For each replication, we randomly select a new sample of one worker per referee 
per round. The presented estimates are the average coefficient estimates (over all replications). The standard deviations 
are the standard deviations of the coefficient estimates. For variable definitions, see Table 4 and its notes.  
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
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A7. Comparison between rounds 
The analysis of referees’ behavior aggregates observations for rounds 1 and 2. 
However, it seems possible that some referees changed their behavior between 
rounds. To allow for this, Table A12 re-estimates regressions (1) and (2) from 
Table 4 separately for each round. This allows us to investigate whether the 
impact of quality and bribes was different in round 1 and round 2. This analysis 
uses only one observation per cluster, and hence we no longer compute standard 
errors using wild bootstraps, but use robust standard errors to compute p-values 
instead. 
 
TABLE A12 – OLS REGRESSIONS FOR KEEPWINNER AND KEEPBOTH SEPARATELY FOR EACH ROUND 
Probability (winning) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Bribe Difference  .292*** .295*** .184** -.049 
 (.000) (.001) (.025) (.556) 
Quality Difference -.112 .113 .270*** .289** 
(bribes differ) (.118) (.246) (.000) (.014) 
Quality Difference .342*** .372*** .280** .293*** 
(bribes identical) (.003) (.002) (.018) (.001) 
     
Treatment KeepWinner KeepWinner KeepBoth KeepBoth 
     
Selected Workers Random Random Random Random 
Standard Errors Robust Robust Robust Robust 
Round 1 2 1 2 
Observations 20 20 20 20 
Clusters 20 20 20 20 
     
Notes: OLS estimates (p-values). The dependent variable is a dummy that specifies whether the selected worker was 
selected as the winner. For other variable definitions, see Table 4 and its notes. P-values (in brackets) are calculated 
using robust standard errors. For all specifications, we randomly select one worker per referee in each round.  
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
 
Columns (1) and (2) show that in the KeepWinner treatment, bribes matter 
equally in both rounds. Further, we find that quality has a similar impact in both 
rounds when bribes are identical, and is not significant in either round when 
bribes differ. For treatment KeepBoth, columns (3) and (4) show the effect of 
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quality is more important than the effect of bribes in both rounds. Both quality 
coefficients are very similar across rounds and are significant in both cases. The 
only difference from the analysis presented in the main text is that the coefficient 
for bribes is zero in round 2 and positive and significant in round 1. This finding 
suggests referees may have been more receptive toward bribes in round 1 than in 
round 2, though the effect of quality stays the same through both rounds.
8
 
Another potential explanation for why behavior might differ across rounds is 
that referees may have alternated between workers across rounds. This 
explanation may in particular have been the case when bribes and/or joke quality 
were equal. In the remainder of this section, we check whether alternating played 
an important role in either of the two main treatments. 
First, we show that alternating cannot by itself explain our results. Indeed, if all 
referees were alternating, neither quality nor bribes would be significant in any 
treatment. To illustrate this, we ran simulations in which we used workers’ actual 
behavior from the experiment but replaced referees’ choices with a random 
winner in round 1 and then had them choose the other worker in round 2.  
The results of this simulation are displayed in Table A13 and show that, as 
expected, the average estimated coefficient over all simulations is essentially zero 
for all variables and both treatments. Further, the quality and bribe variables are 
only significant in approximately 5% of all simulations in both treatments, again 
as expected by chance. Third, in only .1% of simulation samples (i.e., 2 out of 
2,000 across both treatments) were the same coefficients significant (at the 5% 
level) and had the same sign as in the actual regression estimates. Thus, the 
simulations strongly suggest our results cannot have been generated by alternating 
alone.  
                                                          
8
 One potential reason for this result is that, by chance, a greater number of pairs of jokes in round 1 were very similar 
in quality. If referees found that deciding between two very similar jokes was difficult, they may have selected the better 
bribe instead. In line with this reasoning, we showed in appendix A4 that referees appear to have been more likely to care 
about bribes when jokes were of similar quality. 
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TABLE A13—SIMULATIONS FOR ALTERNATING 
               Actual Estimate Simulation Estimate Sim. Est. Significant 
KeepWinner 
 
   
Bribe Difference  .308*** -.001 5.7% 
   
Quality Difference .014 .003 5.0% 
(bribes differ)    
Quality Difference .336** -.001 5.6% 
(bribes identical)    
KeepBoth    
Bribe Difference  .086 .001 4.9% 
    
Quality Difference .262** .000 5.1% 
(bribes differ)    
Quality Difference .275** .001 5.2% 
(bribes identical)    
Notes: The first column (Actual Estimates) gives the actual coefficient estimates from column (1) (upper panel) and 
column (2) (lower panel) of Table 4. The second column (Simulation Estimate) presents the corresponding average 
coefficient estimates from the simulations with alternating. Column 3 (Sim. Est. Significant) presents the percentage of 
times in which the respective estimated coefficient was significant at the 5% level (in either direction) in a simulation. 
Here, we used clustered standard errors to calculate significance, because using bootstraps would have been too 
computationally intensive. 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level (Column 1 only) 
 
Though referees alternating across rounds cannot fully explain our results, 
alternating behavior might have still played a role in some cases. For example, 
referees might have alternated in cases in which bribes and/or quality were very 
similar. To check whether alternating played a role, we control for it directly by 
adding a dummy for round 1 winners to our regression and interacting it with a 
round 2 dummy. If alternating plays a role, round 1 winners should be less likely 
to win in round 2, and hence the coefficient for this interaction effect should be 
negative and significant.  
Table A14 below presents the results in columns (2) and (4). Columns (1) and 
(3) report the relevant regressions from Table 4 (columns (1) and (2) respectively) 
for ease of comparison. In KeepWinner, the coefficient for round 1 winners is 
positive and significant at the 10% level. A positive coefficient is inconsistent 
with alternating, but note the effect is small and could be spurious, for example, if 
the round 1 winner had the better bribe in both round 1 and round 2. Importantly, 
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the comparison between column (1) and (2) shows that the coefficients for bribes 
and quality remain mostly unaffected by allowing for alternating. 
In KeepBoth (column (4)), however, alternating does seem to have played a 
role: round 1 winners are 53.1 percentage points less likely to win in round 2 than 
round 1 losers (who have a 75% chance of winning in round 2). The coefficient 
for bribes also increases slightly and is now significant, though it is still 
substantially smaller than the quality coefficients and the bribe coefficient for 
KeepWinner. Allowing for alternating does not affect the coefficients for quality. 
Why does alternating play a role in KeepBoth but not in KeepWinner? One 
possible explanation is that in the absence of profit-maximization motives, 
referees typically select the better joke. However, in some cases, the two jokes 
were of very similar quality, and referees might alternate in such cases. Thus, 
alternating may have emerged when neither greed nor joke quality could 
determine referee behavior. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that 
controlling for alternating does not significantly change the coefficient estimates 
for quality, which still plays a more important role in treatment KeepBoth. 
Similarly, controlling for alternating does not affect the coefficient estimates for 
KeepWinner, where bribes are more important than quality. 
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TABLE A14 – OLS REGRESSIONS ALLOWING FOR ALTERNATING  
Probability (winning) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Bribe Difference  .308*** .272*** .086 .143** 
 (.000) (.000) (.140) (.020) 
Quality Difference .014 .006 262** .264*** 
(bribes differ) (.762) (.894) (.010) (.008) 
Quality Difference .336** .326** .275** .342** 
(bribes identical) (.020) (.014) (.022) (.014) 
Round 2  -.029  .252* 
  (.852)  (.072) 
Round1Winner  .257*  -.531** 
  *Round 2  (.094)  (.010) 
     
Treatment KeepWinner KeepWinner KeepBoth KeepBoth 
     
Selected Workers Random Random Random Random 
Observations 40 40 40 40 
Clusters 20 20 20 20 
     
Notes: OLS estimates (p-values). The dependent variable is a dummy that specifies whether the selected worker was 
selected as the winner. Round 2 is a dummy for round 2 observations, and round 1 winner is a dummy for workers who 
won in round 1. For other variable definitions, see Table 4 and its notes. P-values (in brackets) are calculated using wild 
bootstraps. We randomly select one worker per referee in each round.  
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
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A8. Equilibrium for KeepBoth 
This section gives an overview of equilibrium bribing behavior for workers in 
treatment KeepBoth, under the assumption that the referee allocates the prize 
based on the bribes. Since referees get to keep the bribes of both workers in 
treatment KeepBoth, however, they are financially indifferent between the two 
workers. Therefore, we allow for the possibility that the referee may instead use 
an allocation rule that rewards the lower bribe with some probability. Specifically, 
the referee will reward the higher bribe with probability δ, where δ can range 
from 0 (referees always select the lower bribe) to 1 (referees always select the 
higher bribe), and allocates the prize randomly (with equal probability) if both 
bribes are equal.  
Given this allocation rule, the expected value of bribing a given amount 𝑏 
equals: 
EΠ(bi = b) = P(b > bj)δp +  P(b = bj)
1
2
p + P(b < bj)(1 − δ)p − b 
Here, 𝑏𝑗 is the bribe of the competing worker, and 𝑝 = 10 is the prize obtained by 
the winning worker. In equilibrium, each worker  i  chooses a strategy σi =
{σb}
i = (σ0, … , σ5) that specifies the probability that worker i plays any given 
bribe, such that the expected payoff is maximized given the strategy of the 
competing worker, σj. Since the best response functions depend on the referee's 
allocation rule, equilibrium worker behavior depends on δ. 
We focus on pure strategy equilibria of the game, if they exist, and otherwise 
specify the symmetric mixed equilibrium. Deriving the equilibrium for a given δ 
can be done in three steps. The first step is to eliminate strictly dominated bribes. 
If more than one bribe amount remains, the second step is to then check for pure 
strategy equilibria. If necessary, the final step is to compute the symmetric mixed 
equilibrium (ME). For the ME, no profitable deviations should be possible. This 
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means that all bribe amounts that are assigned strictly positive probabilities in 
equilibrium need to have equal expected payoffs, and other bribe amounts need to 
have a lower (or equal) expected payoff. Hence, deriving the ME entails solving 
the system of equations 𝐸𝛱(𝑏 = 0) = 𝐸𝛱(𝑏 = 1) =..  subject to the constraint 
that all σb are non-negative and sum to one (for both workers). 
For δ ≤ 0.5, referees on average let the worse bribe win. As a result, the unique 
equilibrium is for both workers to bribe zero (i.e., σ0 = 1 for both workers), since 
any larger bribe is both costly and results in a weakly smaller likelihood of 
winning. 
Figure A1 below plots the equilibria for increasing values of δ, on the interval 
δ ∈ [0.5,1], for the parameters used in the experiment. For values close to δ =
0.5, choosing a bribe of 1 or more would mean a sure loss of the bribe (i.e., 1 or 
more) versus an expected gain of ((δ − 0.5) ∗ 10 < 1). Hence for δ ∈ [0.5,0.6), 
both workers bribing zero is also the unique equilibrium. 
For δ = 0.6 , there is an additional pure strategy equilibrium where both 
workers bribe 1, as well as an equilibrium where one worker bribes 1 and the 
other bribes 0. 
For δ ∈ (0.6,1)  there are only mixed equilibria. For δ ∈ (0.6,0.7], the 
equilibrium is for both workers to randomize between 0, 1 and 2, where 0 and 2 
are chosen with equal probability. Intuitively, there can be no pure strategy 
equilibria, since the best responses to 0, 1 and 2 are 1, 2 and 0 respectively. As δ 
increases over the interval, 2 is becoming an ever more attractive bribe, since the 
advantage relative to a bribe of 1 is increasing, and the disadvantage with respect 
to a bribe of 0 is decreasing. Therefore, in equilibrium, the frequency of bribes of 
0 and 2 must increase. 
For δ ∈ [0.7,0.8] the equilibrium is for workers to randomize between 0, 1, 2, 3 
and 4, where 0, 2 and 4 are chosen with equal probability, as are 1 and 3. Bribes 
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of 3 and 4 are added to the equilibrium since they are no longer strictly dominated 
by a bribe of zero, otherwise the intuition is similar to the above.  
For δ ∈ [0.8,0.9], equilibrium randomization occurs between 0,1,2,3, and 5, 
again with 0 and 2 chosen equally often, and similarly for 1 and 3, with 5 chosen 
more often than any of the other bribes. For δ ∈ [0.9,1)  workers randomize 
between 0,1 and 5, with 5 chosen most often. Intuitively, as the highest bribe 
starts winning with high regularity, bribing 5 becomes more attractive, which is 
amplified by the fact that bribes of 6 or higher were not permitted in the 
experiment. Given that many workers bribe 5, it is no longer attractive to bribe 4 
or other intermediate amounts, since these bribes will always lose to a bribe of 5 
but still incur the certain cost of sending the bribe. However, bribes of zero are 
still attractive, since they are costless and have a positive probability of wining 
even against bribes of 5. Finally, bribes of 1 are also not very costly and have the 
added advantage of beating the 0 bribes with high likelihood. 
In addition, for δ ∈ {0.7,0.8,0.9}, any linear combination between both relevant 
aforementioned equilibria is also a ME. Finally, for δ = 1, the equilibrium is a 
pure strategy equilibrium where both workers bribe the maximum. Note also that 
the fraction of referees who picked the highest bribe in treatment KeepBoth in the 
experiment was .6364. The mixed equilibrium corresponding to this fraction is for 
workers to bribe 0 or 2 with probability .267 and bribe 1 with probability .467. 
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FIGURE A1. EQUILIBRIA FOR TREATMENT KEEPBOTH. 
Notes: The figure displays the probability σb that a bribe b is chosen in equilibrium as a function of the referee’s allocation 
rule δ. Here, the referee’s allocation rule specifies the fraction of times the referee chooses the highest bribe as the winner.  
 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
σ
b
 
δ 
σ0 
σ1 
σ2 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
σ
b
 
δ 
σ3 
σ4 
σ5 
74 
 
A9. Additional Figures 
 
 
FIGURE A2. WIN CHANCE FOR KEEPWINNER AND KEEPBOTH 
Notes: Workers are classified as having a better rating when at least 65.1% of independent raters agree their joke is 
better. 
 
FIGURE A3. WIN CHANCE WHEN HAVING THE HIGHER BRIBE FOR THE ADDITIONAL TREATMENTS 
      Notes: The figure displays the fraction of cases referees let the higher bribe win in the six additional treatments. 
RejectKW and RejectKB refer to the KeepWinnerReject and KeepBothReject treatment respectively. 
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FIGURE A4. WIN CHANCE WHEN HAVING THE BEST JOKE FOR THE ADDITIONAL TREATMENTS 
Notes: The figure displays the fraction of cases referees let the higher bribe win in the six additional treatments.      
RejectKW and RejectKB refer to the KeepWinnerReject and KeepBothReject treatment respectively. Workers are 
classified as having a higher quality when at least 65.1% of independent raters agree their joke is better. 
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Appendix B FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION 
B1. Worker Instructions 
Welcome to today’s experiment.9 Please read the instructions carefully. If you 
have any questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will 
come to your desk to answer your question.
10
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
You have been assigned to the role of Participant A. For the remainder of the 
experiment you will be matched with two other participants: Participant B and a 
Referee. The Referee will now be moved to a different room. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
On your desk you can find an envelope with 10 dollars. This is your show-up fee 
for taking part in this experiment. Both you and Participant B have received a $10 
show-up fee whereas the Referee has received a $5 show-up fee. Please do not 
remove the money from the envelope until you are instructed to. 
 
Both you and Participant B will be asked to work on a task for two rounds. The 
task will be explained below. After each round the Referee will decide whether 
you or Participant B performed the task better. The Participant that performed 
better (as decided by the Referee) will receive an additional $10 prize on top of 
the show-up fee. The other Participant will receive nothing. 
 
You will be matched to the same Referee and Participant B in both rounds. None 
of you will ever know the identity of the other two participants. 
                                                          
9
 These are the instructions for the KeepWinner treatment. The instructions for treatment Objective are presented 
below. The instructions for the other treatments are similar to KeepWinner and available upon request. 
10
 A horizontal line indicates that participants went to the next screen. 
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Do you have any questions before we explain the task to you? 
________________________________________________________________ 
Your task: 
Your task is to come up with a joke about a certain topic, which will be 
announced after the instructions. In total, you will have 10 minutes to come up 
with a joke. The joke can be short or long, a simple one liner or a full anecdote. 
The experimenter will let you know when you have 5 minutes as well as 1 minute 
left for the round. 
________________________________________________________________ 
Check-up questions 
How much will you earn (in dollars) in a given round if you are the winner? 
Who is going to evaluate your task? 
True or false: the Referee and Participant B will be the same participants in both 
rounds of the experiment. 
You are now ready to start the experiment. Please raise your hand when you are 
ready to start the task. Do not proceed to the next page. The experimenter will 
instruct you to start when the other participants have finished reading the 
instructions. 
________________________________________________________________ 
Please write a joke about economists. You have 10 minutes to complete the task.  
________________________________________________________________ 
What do you believe is the probability that you wrote better jokes than Participant 
B?  
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Please wait while we are printing your joke. After you have received your joke, 
please put it into the large envelope with the number so it can be handed over to 
your Referee. You also have the option to add money for the Referee and put it in 
the envelope with the joke. For this purpose, you can take up to $5 out of the 
smaller envelope with your show-up fee and put it into the larger envelope 
together with the joke you wrote.  
Participant B also has the option to add up to $5 to the envelope he/she sends to 
the Referee.  
The Referee will be given both your envelope with the joke and the money and 
Participants B’s. He/she will then be asked to read the jokes and decide which one 
wins. If the Referee chooses your joke, then you will get an additional $10 and the 
Referee will keep the money you sent him/her. Participant B will get the money 
he/she sent to the Referee back. If the Referee chooses Participants B’s joke, then 
Participant B will get an additional $10 and the Referee will keep the money 
he/she sent to him. In this case you will get back the money that you sent to the 
Referee.  
Please raise your hand when the envelope for the Referee is ready. The 
experimenter will bring it to the Referee in the next room. After the Referee has 
determined the winner, the envelope will be collected by the experimenter. The 
envelope will be returned to you after the Referee has finished grading the second 
round of jokes.
11
 
                                                          
11
 Instructions for round 2 started from “please write a joke about economists” onwards and were identical to the 
instructions for round 1, except that workers were instructed to write a joke about psychologists instead. 
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 B2. Referee Instructions 
Welcome to today’s experiment. Please read the instructions carefully. If you 
have any questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will 
come to your desk to answer your question. 
________________________________________________________________ 
You have been assigned to the role of the Referee. For the remainder of the 
experiment you will be matched with two other participants: Participant A and 
Participant B. 
Please raise your hand. The experimenter will escort you to a different room. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Welcome to the experiment. On your desk you will find a small envelope with $5. 
This is your show-up fee for taking part in this experiment; Participant A and 
Participant B have received a $10 show-up fee for the experiment. 
Today your task is to rate the quality of a joke written by Participant A and a joke 
written by Participant B. You will be matched to the same Participant A and 
Participant B in both rounds. None of you will ever know the identity of the other 
two participants. 
Both Participants have 10 minutes to write a joke.  After Participants A and B 
have finished their jokes, they will print them and put them in an envelope which 
will be brought to you by an experimenter.  
You will then have 5 minutes to read both jokes and determine who of the two did 
the best job, i.e. determine the winner. The winner will receive a prize of $10, 
whereas the loser will receive nothing. Please make sure to indicate the winner by 
placing a winner card in the winner’s envelope and a loser card in the loser’s 
envelope.  
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You will also be asked to rate the quality of both the winner’s and the loser’s joke 
on a scale from 0 to 10 (on the evaluation form). 
The envelopes will then be collected by the experimenter and you will be asked to 
grade a second round of jokes, written by Participants A and B while you were 
grading.   
The envelopes for both rounds will be returned to Participants A and B at the end 
of the second round.  
The topic for the first round will be ‘economists’, the topic of the second round 
will be announced to you after you finish grading the first round. 
Please wait while Participants A and B finish writing their jokes. If you have any 
questions in the meantime, please ask the experimenter.  
In a few moments you will receive two envelopes containing the jokes written by 
Participants A and B. To grade their jokes, please indicate you rating for both 
Participants on the evaluation form on a scale from 0 to 10.  
Participants A and B also have the opportunity to add money to their envelope. 
You have the option to keep the money sent to you by either Participant A or 
Participant B. If you keep the money of a Participant, he or she will automatically 
be the winner. The loser’s money will then be returned. 
After determining the winner, please make sure to indicate the winner by placing 
a winner card in the winner’s envelope and a loser card in the loser’s envelope. 
After five minutes, an experimenter will collect the envelopes. The envelopes will 
be returned to Participants A and B at the end of the second round. 
Please remain patient while we are printing the jokes.
12
  
                                                          
12
 Instructions for round 2 contained the topic of the second round. Otherwise, they were identical to the last page of 
the instructions for round 1 (from “In a few moments” onwards).  
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B3. Independent Raters Instructions 
Welcome! 
In this experiment you will be shown six pairs of jokes. Jokes in each pair will 
either be about economists or about psychologists. Participants in a previous 
experiment wrote the jokes in 10 minutes. For each pair of jokes, you will be 
asked to rate the quality of both jokes and to indicate which one is better. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Please rate the quality of the following jokes about economists (psychologists). 
Make sure to read both jokes before rating. 
What is the quality of this joke? (0-10) 
Which one is the best joke? (Joke A, Joke B) 
 
B4. Worker Instructions Treatment Objective 
Welcome to today’s experiment. Please read the instructions carefully. If you 
have any questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will 
come to your desk to answer your question. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
You have been assigned to the role of Participant A. For the remainder of the 
experiment you will be matched with two other participants: Participant A and a 
Referee. 
The Referee will now be moved to a different room. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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On your desk you can find an envelope with 10 dollars. This is your show-up fee 
for taking part in this experiment. Both you and Participant B have received a $10 
show-up fee whereas the referee has received a $5 show-up fee. Please do not 
remove the money from the envelope until you are instructed to. 
Both you and Participant B will be asked to work on a task for two rounds. The 
task will be explained below. After each round the Referee will decide whether 
you or Participant B performed the task better. Your goal is to complete as many 
words as possible in 5 minutes. 
The Participant that performed better (as decided by the Referee) will receive an 
additional $10 prize on top of the show-up fee. The other Participant will receive 
nothing. You will be matched to the same Referee and Participant B in both 
rounds. None of you will ever know the identity of the other two participants. 
Do you have any questions before we explain the task to you? 
__________________________________________________________________ 
During each round of the experiment you will be shown a sequence of words. 
These words will be printed in different colors: yellow, blue, purple, orange, or 
red. Your task is to indicate the color of each word. Only the colors named 
correctly will counts towards your total. This task will last for a total of 5 minutes. 
You can indicate the color of your choice using the keyboard. The relevant keys 
are y (for yellow), r (red), p (purple), o (orange) and b (blue). The key-color 
combinations will also be visible at the bottom of the screen throughout the task. 
Be aware: if you press any key other than the one corresponding to the correct 
color, this will not be counted as a correct response. This also holds for keys that 
do not refer to any color. On the next page you will have the opportunity to 
practice the task with a sequence of 10 words. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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After you finish the task, your score will be printed on a score sheet that will be 
handed over to your referee. Your score sheet will be similar to the example 
below. Every color you successfully indicated will be represented by a dot on the 
score sheet. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Please answer the following questions before proceeding to the next page. 
Question 1: How much will you earn (in dollars) in a given round if you are the 
winner? 
 Question 2: Who is going to evaluate your task? Participant A, Participant B or 
the Referee? 
Question 3: True or false: the Referee and Participant will be the same 
participants in both rounds of the experiment. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
You are now ready to start the experiment. 
Please raise your hand when you are ready to start the task. 
Do not proceed to the next page. The experimenter will instruct you to start when 
the other participants have finished reading the instructions. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
What do you believe is the probability that you have a better score than 
Participant ? 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Please wait while we are printing your score sheet. 
After you have received your score sheet, please put it into the large envelope 
with the number so it can be handed over to your Referee. 
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You also have the option to add money for the Referee and put it in the envelope 
with the score sheet. For this purpose, you can take up to $5 out of the smaller 
envelope with your show-up fee and put it into the larger envelope together with 
your score sheet. 
Participant B also has the option to add up to $5 to the envelope he/she sends to 
the Referee. 
The Referee will be given both your envelope with the score sheet and the money 
and Participant B’s envelope. He/she will then be asked to determine which 
Participant wins. If the Referee decides that you win, then you will get an 
additional $10 and the Referee will keep the money you sent him/her. Participant 
B will get back the money he/she sent to the Referee. 
If the Referee decides that Participant B wins, then Participant B will get an 
additional $10 and the Referee will keep the money he/she sent to him. In this 
case you will get back the money that you sent out to the Referee. 
Please raise your hand when the envelope for the Referee is ready. The 
experimenter will bring it to the Referee in the next room. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
You are now ready to start round 2. This round will be similar to round 1: you 
will again have to indicate the color of a sequence of words and the task will 
again be graded by the Referee. Please remember that you will be matched to the 
same Referee and the same Participant as before. You will again have the option 
to send money to the referee after you finish your task.
13
 
  
                                                          
13
 Instructions for round 2 were the same as round 1, starting from “what do you believe is the probability …”. 
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B4. Referee Instructions Treatment Objective 
Welcome to the experiment. On your desk you will find a small envelope with $5. 
This is your show-up fee for taking part in this experiment; Participant A and 
Participant B have received a $10 show-up fee for the experiment. 
Today your task is to determine the score  of Participant A and Participant B on a 
task. You will be matched to the same Participant A and Participant B in both 
rounds. None of you will ever know the identity of the other two participants. 
Participant A and B’s task is to determine the color of a series of words displayed 
on their computer screen. The participants will be shown a sequence of words one 
at the time and they will have to indicate the colors of the words. Their goal is to 
complete as many words as possible in 5 minutes. A screenshot of the task has 
been provided to you on a separate sheet. 
Both Participants have 5 minutes for the task.  After 5 minutes, their scores will 
be printed on a score sheet and each one of them will get his or her own printout.  
The printout score sheet will be similar to the sample score sheet provided to you 
as an example. Each color successfully determined by the participants will be 
represented by a single dot on the score sheet. Each participant will then put 
his/her score sheet in an envelope that will be brought to you by the experimenter.  
You will then have 5 minutes to determine the winner. The winner will receive a 
prize of $10, whereas the loser will receive nothing. Please make sure to indicate 
the winner by placing a winner card in the winner’s envelope and a loser card in 
the loser’s envelope.  
The envelopes will then be returned to Participants A and B and you will be asked 
to grade a second round of score sheets representing the number of colors 
successfully indicated by Participants A and B while you were grading.  
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Please wait while Participants A and B complete the first round. If you have any 
questions in the meantime, please ask the experimenter.  
__________________________________________________________________ 
In a few moments you will receive two envelopes containing the score sheets of 
Participants A and B.  
Participants A and B also have the opportunity to add money to their envelope. 
You have the option to keep the money sent to you by either Participant A or 
Participant B. If you keep the money of a Participant, he or she will automatically 
be the winner. The loser’s money will then be returned. 
After determining the winner, please make sure to indicate the winner by placing 
a winner card in the winner’s envelope and a loser card in the loser’s envelope. 
After five minutes, the experimenter will collect the envelopes and return them to 
Participants A and B in the other room. 
Please remain patient while we are printing the score sheets. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Please wait while Participants A and B are finishing the second round. After 
Participants A and B have finished the second round, the procedure will be similar 
to round 1. 
You will again receive two envelopes containing the score sheets of Participants 
A and B. 
Participants A and B also again have the opportunity to add money to their 
envelope. You have the option to keep the money sent to you by either Participant 
A or Participant B. If you keep the money of a Participant, he or she will 
automatically be the winner. The loser’s money will then be returned. 
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After determining the winner, please make sure to indicate the winner by placing 
a winner card in the winner’s envelope and a loser card in the loser’s envelope. 
After five minutes, an experimenter will collect the envelopes and return them to 
Participants A and B in the other room. 
Please remain patient while Participants A and B are finishing the second round. 
 
FIGURE B1. SAMPLE SCORE SHEET FOR TREATMENT OBJECTIVE 
Notes: the figure was used as an example for participants in the experiment. It was generated using the same procedure as 
the score sheets used in the experiment, with every dot representing one correct response on the task. 
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Appendix C Examples of Jokes FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION 
In this section, we present 9 examples of jokes written by participants in the 
experiment. The following jokes are the three best, the three worst and the three 
median jokes (as determined by the independent raters). All other jokes are 
available upon request.  
C1. Good Jokes 
A psychologist was conducting a group therapy session about addictions and 
obsessions, in which four mothers and their children were participating. Each of 
the mothers was asked by the psychologist to share their obsession as well as their 
kid's names. The first mother said, "I am obsessed with eating, and my daughter's 
name is Candy." The second mother said, "I am obsessed with money, and my 
daughter's name is Penny." The third mother said, "I am an alcoholic, my 
daughter's name is Brandy." The fourth mother got up, took her son by the hand, 
and whispered in his ear, "Come on, Dick, let's go home." (Average Rating 8/10) 
 
A man is at the library and is trying to find an open seat to study. He finds an 
open spot next to an attractive young woman and asks if he can sit there. She 
responds rather loudly, "NO, I DON'T WANT TO SPEND THE NIGHT WITH 
YOU!" Everyone in the library turns to stare at the man. Embarrassed by the 
attention, the man goes on and finds another spot to study. Later, the same young 
woman goes up to the man and tells him, "I'm a psychologist and I study social 
behavior. I know I made you feel embarrassed, right?" The man looks up and 
responds rather loudly, "$200 DOLLARS JUST FOR ONE NIGHT?! THAT'S 
TOO MUCH!" Everyone in the library turns to stare at the young woman this 
time. The man then proceeds to tell her in a subdued voice, "I'm a lawyer. I know 
how to make people feel guilty." (Average rating 7.63/10) 
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Why did the psychologist get kicked out school? The professor caught him 
committing Freud (Average rating 6.6/10) 
 
C1. Median Jokes 
A psychologist, an economist, and a physicist were asked for their professional 
input on ways to improve execution by guillotine. The physicist said "To make 
the execution less painful, the blade should be heavier because then the blade will 
travel more quickly and kill the victim sooner". The economist said "The blade 
shouldn't be cleaned in between executions, because then you can save the cost of 
cleaning supplies. They're going to die anyway, so sterilizing the blade isn't an 
ethical concern". The psychologist said "How do we know how much pain the 
person is in to make it less painful? I think we need more trials, but that's not 
possible because people only have one life to live. We should use cats! They have 
nine lives!" Everyone else decided to use the psychologist for a trial because they 
all owned cats.  (Average Rating 3.5/10) 
Economists. What my friends think I do: sit back and stare at money. What my 
parents think I do: earn money. What my colleagues think I do: scam money and 
help with money laundering. What the academics think I do: create awesome 
financial theories and win the Nobel Prize. What the public think I do: nothing. 
What I really do: look at lines and graphs all day long (Average Rating 3.5/10) 
Three psychologists are looking up at the stars. The first, a Freudian, sees the Big 
Dipper in close proximity to Orion's belt and understands instantly the sexual 
frustration nestled there.  The second, a social psychologist, scoffs, and asks the 
first what Cassiopeia's Little Dipper means, then.  He sees the sky in aggregate, a 
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multitude of decision-making stars cohering to a wider social contract.  The third 
is silent.  "Hey, Silence of the Lambs," the Freudian psychologist calls out.  
"Who's right about the stars?" Number Three, an abnormal psychologist, is rather 
convinced that the stars are, in fact, a 1970s construct remnant from the Star Wars 
campaign, part of a government conspiracy, and also happen to be transmitting 
this very conversation to (secretly) Red Russia. Then a goat comes along and 
speaks.  None pay it any heed. (Average Rating 3.5/10) 
C1. Bad Jokes 
One economist one day went to the shooping centre to buy a keyboard,  the price 
labbled on the hat was $59.99. While the keyboard is using solar as its battery, he 
start to computer the profit he can get from the keyboard. Since the solar 
keyboard is much expensive than the normal one, he think that he can use it 3 
years, and if he uses the normal keyboard the battery is ... As he thinking, here is a 
college student came to the store, he bought the keyboard without thinking, and 
the solar keyboard is out of stock! (Average Rating 1.1/10) 
One day the economics was walking beside the beach and began to wonder what 
the white coloring was up ahead. / Once the economics had reached it then it 
suddenly had the realization that it was the face of mist. Economics decided to 
walk into it, and the mist decided to walk through economics as well....and what 
became of them after that?...That was when economists began their journey! 
(Average Rating 1.1/10) 
A man asked a Psychologist, "Sir, I had a dream that I was swinging on a tree 
swing like the one in my old house when I younger. The trees were sturdy Oaks 
that were many years old, and I remember their branches being slightly gnarled. I 
remember the sun peeking through the leaves and my mother called my name, but 
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as I was running to reach her, the ground opened up and swallowed me. What can 
this mean?" The Psychologist looked at the man with a furrowed brow, leaned his 
head back and stared at the ceiling. "Well, the branches mean you are very 
sexually repressed as they blocked your view of the sun clearly, and that the 
woman of your dreams is your mom. Clearly you have an Oedipus complex, as 
the ground breaking up is a sign of your father stopping you from gaining access 
to your mother. All in all, you love your mom and need to kill your dad." The 
man blinked a few times, then stood up. "You made that up didn't you?" he asked 
the Psychologist. With a hearty sigh the Psychologist sat up straight and looked 
the man dead in the eyes. "Yup."  (Average Rating 1.2/10) 
 
All discussion papers are downloadable: 
http://www.wzb.eu/en/publications/discussion-papers/markets-and-choice 
Discussion Papers of the Research Area Markets and Choice 2016 
Research Unit: Market Behavior 
David Danz, Steffen Huck, Philippe Jehiel SP II 2016-201 
Public statistics and private experience:  
Varying feedback information in a take-or-pass game 
 
 
Jana Friedrichsen 
Signals sell: Designing a product line when consumers have  
social image concerns 
SPII 2016-202 
  
Uri Gneezy, Silvia Saccardo, Roel van Veldhuizen 
Bribery: Greed versus reciprocity 
SPII 2016-203  
Research Unit: Economics of Change 
Armin Falk, Nora Szech SP II 2016-301 
Pleasures of skill and moral conduct 
 
Thomas Deckers, Armin Falk, Fabian Kosse, Nora Szech SP II 2016-302 
Homo moralis: Personal characteristics, institutions, and  
moral decision-making  
Jenny Simon, Justian Mattias Valasek SP II 2016-303 
The political economy of multilateral aid funds 
 
Vittorio Bassi, Steffen Huck, Imran Rasul SP II 2016-304 
A note on charitable giving by corporates and aristocrats: 
Evidence from a field experiment  
Ludwig Ensthaler, Steffen Huck, Johannes Leutgeb SP II 2016-305 
Games played through agents in the laboratory – A test of 
Prat & Rustichini's model  
Research Professorship: Market Design: Theory and Pragmatics 
Kevin McLaughlin, Daniel Friedman SP II 2016-501 
Online ad auctions: An experiment 
 
 
